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FOR RESOLVING DISPUTES UNDER THE
FAIR LABOR STANDARDS ACT
Charles C. Jackson t
No time is a good time needlessly to sap the principle of
collective bargaining or to disturb harmonious and fruitful relations between employers and employees brought
about by collective bargaining.'
-Justice Frankfurter
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COLLECTIVE BARGAININGIFLSA
INTRODUCTION

Congress designed the National Labor Relations Act
(NLRA)2 and the Fair Labor Standards Act (FLSA or Wage-Hour
law) 3 to promote similar goals. In enacting the NLRA in 1935,
Congress concluded that the economic well-being of workers
would improve if they were allowed to bargain collectively
through their own representatives. 4
Similarly, Congress
fashioned the minimum wage and overtime provisions of the
Wage-Hour law three years later to insure a decent living wage,
prohibit interminable working hours, and spread employment
opportunities. 5 These seemingly harmonious statutory goals conflict, however, when management and labor negotiate a collective
bargaining agreement containing a provision that does not literally comply with the FLSA. Since 1938, the Supreme Court has
only twice squarely addressed the conflict between the national
policy favoring collective bargaining and the dictates of governmental wage and hour regulation under the FLSA. 6 Each
time, a divided Court held that collectively bargained compensation arrangements must yield to the rigid rules of the FLSA.7 This
view demands close scrutiny today. Both of the post-1938 Supreme
Court cases have been overturned by subsequent amendments to
the FLSA. 8 In addition, since 1947 Congress and the Supreme
Court have elevated the negotiation and enforcement of collective
bargaining agreements to the pinnacle of our national labor policy. 9 The lower federal and state courts have responded to these
events with a host of irreconcilable decisions that often undermine

2

Pub. L. No. 74-198, 49 Stat. 449 (codified at 29 U.S.C. §§ 141-187 (1976 & Supp.

III 1979)).
3 Pub. L. No. 75-718, 52 Stat. 1060 (codified at 29 U.S.C. §§ 201-219 (1976 & Supp.
III 1979)).
See notes 12-22 and accompanying text infra.
2 See notes 23-36 and accompanying text infra.
6 Bay Ridge Operating Co. v. Aaron, 334 U.S. 446 (1948); Jewell Ridge Coal Corp. v.
Mine Workers Local 6167, 325 U.S. 161 (1945).
See notes 58-90 and accompanying text infra.
8 See notes 91-99 and accompanying text infra.
' See notes 104-27 and accompanying text infra. The 1947 Taft-Hartley amendments
to § 7 of the National Labor Relations Act also placed the employee's right not to join labor
unions on an equal footing with the right to join labor unions and to bargain collectively
with employers:
Employees shall have the right to self-organization, to form, join, or assist
labor organizations, to bargain collectively through representatives of their own

CORNELL LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 66:193

collective bargaining and ignore the federal policy favoring internal resolution of labor-management disputes. The Supreme Court
recently granted a writ of certiorari in one of these casesBarrentine v. Arkansas-Best Freight System, Inc.' 0
This Article examines the conflict between the NLRA and
the FLSA and sets forth a basis for reconciling the general principles of collective bargaining with the often technical requirements
of the Wage-Hour law. Section I reviews the policy objectives and
implications of the duty to bargain under the NLRA and the goals
and technical requirements of the overtime and minimum wage
provisions of the FLSA. The early Supreme Court decisions are
analyzed in Section II, followed by a discussion in Section III of
the impact of legislation amending the FLSA and the enactment
of section 301(a) of the Labor Management Relations (TaftHartley) Act of 1947. Recent lower court decisions illustrating the
damage to national labor policy caused by judicial misunderstanding of the NLRA/FLSA relation are discussed in Section IV.
The Article then suggests an approach for resolving NLRA/
FLSA conflicts. Subject to certain procedural safeguards, the literal requirements of the FLSA should not bind employers if they
have negotiated a collective bargaining agreement with a properly
certified representative of their employees. Courts should uphold
collectively bargained compensation arrangements that reflect the
legitimate needs of organized labor and industry even if their
negotiated wage and hour formulae do not fully comply with the
FLSA or its regulations. Subordinating the FLSA to the requirements of collective bargaining does not sacrifice the underlying
objectives of the FLSA; indeed, Congress never intended the
FLSA to interfere with collectively 11bargained labor agreements
that do not comply with the FLSA.

choosing, and to engage in other concerted activities for the purpose of collective bargaining or other mutual aid or protection, and shall also have the right to
refrainfrom any or all of such activities....
29 U.S.C. § 157 (1976) (emphasis added).
QP615 F.2d 1194 (8th Cir.), cert. granted, 49 U.S.L.W. 3245 (Oct. 6, 1980) (No. 792006).
11 See notes 62, 68, 91-99 and accompanying text infra. This Article takes no position
on whether continued enforcement of the FLSA's statutory and regulatory rules is necessary for nonunionized employees.
For the fiscal year ending September 30, 1980, the Department of Labor reported
record recoupment of statutory wages owed under the FLSA. [1980] LAB. LAW REPORTs
No. 448, at 2-3. The Wage-Hour Administration undeniably has recovered and remedied
numerous violations of the statute and regulations. It is unclear, however, whether the stat-
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I
GOALS AND PURPOSES OF THE

NLRA

AND THE

FLSA

A. Economic Well-Being Through Collective Bargaining
Congress designed the NLRA to promote collective bargaining, thereby enhancing the economic well-being of the worker and
ute has achieved its goals of providing a minimal living wage, establishing reasonable work
hours, and spreading employment opportunities.
A congressional study completed in 1967 concluded that hiring and training costs and
the increased cost of fringe benefits which are not subject to the overtime pay requirement
decreases the deterrent effect of the FLSA's overtime provisions and the likelihood
employers will hire more workers. U.S. DEP'T OF LABOR, PREMIUM PAYMENTS FOR OVERTIME
UNDER THE FAIR LABOR STANDARDS ACT (1967). A recent Bureau of Labor Statistics study
reported that the vast majority of employees in medium and large private firms receive
life, health, pension and accident sickness benefits that are fully funded by employers. In
addition, a majority of these employees receive paid holidays, vacations, rest time and sick
leave. [1980] DAILY LAB. REPT. (BNA) No. 126 at B-13 (June 27, 1980). At least in partial
reaction to these job-benefits phenomena, in 1977 Congress established a Minimum Wage
Study Commission to study the social, political and economic ramifications of the minimum
wage, overtime pay and other requirements of the Act, including the issues of the effect of
the minimum wage on unemployment and the exemptions from the Act's overtime pay
requirements. 29 U.S.C. § 204 (Supp. 11 1978). The report of the Minimum Wage Study
Commission is due in May, 1981. [1980] DAILY LAB. REPT. (BNA) No. 192 at A-5 (Oct. 1,
1980).
Commentators have also debated whether the FLSA's goals are served or frustrated by
enforcement of the minimum wage and overtime provisions. For general readings and
varying viewpoints on these issues, see M. FRIEDMAN, CAPITALISM AND FREEDOM 180-81
(1962); Ehrenberg, The Impact Of The Overtime Premium On Employment And Hours In U.S.
Industry, 9 WEsT. ECON. J. 199 (1971); Gailbraith & Morse, Hire Or Overtime: A Best Bet
Method, 54 MANAGEMENT ACCOUNTING 42 (1972); Garbarino, Fringe Benefits and Overtime as
Barriersto Expanding Employment, 17 INDUS. AND LAB. REL. REV. 426 (1964); Gramlich, The
Impact Of Minimum Wages On Other Wages, Employment And Family Incomes, 2 BROOKINGS
PAPERS ON ECONOMIC ACTIVITY 409 (1976); Lundgren & Schneider, A Marginal Cost Model
For The Hiring-Overtime Decision, 17 MANAGEMENT SCIENCE 399 (1971); McKenzie, The Labor
Market Effects of Minimum Wage Laws: A New Perspective, I J. LABOR RESEARCH 255 (1980);
Mincer, Unemployment Effects Of Minimum Wages, 84 J. POL. ECON. S87 (1976); Wallace &
Spruill, How To Minimize Labor Costs During Peak Demand Periods, 52 PERSONNEL 61 (July-Aug.
1975); W. WILLIAMS, YOUTH AND MINORITY UNEMPLOYMENT, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. (Joint
Comm. Print 1977) (95th Cong., Ist Sess., July 6, 1977).
achieve their objectives, organized labor's influence extends beyond those workers actually
represented by labor unions:
In connection with the data concerning the extent of union membership, one
oversimplified assumption should be avoided, i.e., that the number or percentage of organized workers is an adequate index of the influence of organized
labor. Such an assumption ignores the following factors: (1) Unorganized workers within a bargaining unit are directly affected by collective bargaining. (2)
The bargain struck for a bargaining unit is likely to have important consequences for other employees of the same employer who are not represented by
a union....
Similarly, the bargain for an organized plant frequently will directly affect the
terms of employment in unorganized plants of the same employer. (3) Enterprises wholly unorganized may be influenced by patterns set by organized
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minimizing industrial strife.1" The Act's underlying purpose was
to promote industrial peace by establishing the framework for
labor and management to collectively bargain their own agreement on the terms and conditions of employment rather than directly imposing these terms by government fiat. 13 The NLRA
employers. (4) All enterprises, organized and unorganized, are affected by the
impact of particular bargains on output and employment in the bargaining
unit, which in turn affect the supply of labor elsewhere. (5) Finally, the
economic power of particular unions is determined not by the extent of organization in general, but by factors such as the extent of organization of enterprises serving a given product market and the elasticity of the demand for the
product involved.
B. MELTZER, LABOR LAW 49-51 (2d ed. 1977).

The FLSA's child labor provisions do not serve an economic goal as such but reflect a
social judgment that goods produced by young children under intemperate conditions
should not enter the stream of interstate commerce. Thus, these provisions are designed to
prohibit employers from realizing profits through the exploitation of children. See generally 29 U.S.C. § 212 (1976); 29 C.F.R. § 570.1-.129 (1979).
12 The denial by employers of the right of employees to organize and the refusal
by employers to accept the procedure of collective bargaininglead to strikes and other
forms of industrial strife or unrest, which have the intent or the necessary
effect of burdening or obstructing commerce by (a) impairing the efficiency,
safety, or operation of the instrumentalities of commerce; (b) occurring in the
current of commerce; (c) materially affecting, restraining, or controlling the
flow of raw materials or manufactured or processed goods from or into the
channels of commerce, or the prices of such materials or goods in commerce;
or (d) causing diminution of employment and wages in such volume as substantially to impair or disrupt the market-for goods flowing from or into the
channels of commerce.
Experience has proved that protection by law of the right of employees to organize
and bargain collectively safeguards commerce from injury, impairment, or interruption, and promotes the flow of commerce by removing certain recognized sources of
industrialstrife and unrest, by encouraging practices fundamental to the friendly
adjustment of industrial disputes arising out of differences as to wages, hours,
or other working conditions, and by restoring equality of bargainingpower between
employers and employees.
It is hereby declared to be the policy of the United States to eliminate the causes
of certain substantial obstructions to the free flow of commerce and to mitigate
and eliminate these obstructions when they have occurred by encouraging the
practice and procedure of collective bargaining and by protecting the exercise by
workers of full freedom of association, self-organization, and designation of
representatives of their own choosing, for the purpose of negotiating the terms
and conditions of their employment or other mutual aid or protection.
National Labor Relations Act of 1935, Pub. L. No. 74-198, § 1, 49 Stat. 449 (codified at 29
U.S.C. § 151 (1976)) (emphasis added). An additional paragraph was added by the TaftHartley amendments setting forth the congressional policy to eliminate certain labor organization tactics that obstruct commerce. Labor Management Relations (Taft-Hartley) Act
of 1947, Pub. L. No. 80-101, tit. I, § 101, 61 Stat. 136 (codified at 29 U.S.C. § 151 (1976)).
13 See Consolidated Edison Co. v. NLRB, 305 U.S. 206, 236 (1938); NLRB v. Jones &
Laughlin Steel Corp., 301 U.S. 1, 41-42, 45 (1937). See also Teamsters v. Oliver, 358 U.S.
283, 304 (1959).
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made the employer's refusal to bargain in good faith with the
representatives of his employees an unfair labor practice in an
4
effort to guarantee the right of collective bargaining.'
The principle of majority rule is "central to the policy of fostering collective bargaining." 15 If a majority of employees in a
unit authorized for collective bargaining desire union representation, the NLRA permits the union to bargain with the employer
as the exclusive representative of all unit employees, thereby imposing the majority's will on the minority.' 6 The regime of
majority rule secures for all unit members the benefits of collective strength and bargaining power with "full awareness that the
superior strength of some individuals or groups might be subordinated to the interest of the majority." ' 7 Thus, the Supreme
Court has recognized that "[t]he complete satisfaction of all who
8
are represented is hardly to be expected" under this system.'

14 National Labor Relations Act of 1935, Pub. L. No. 74-198, § 8(a)(5), 49 Stat. 452
(codified at 29 U.S.C. § 158(a)(5) (1976)). The 1947 Taft-Hartley amendments to the
NLRA made a union's refusal to bargain in good faith an unfair labor practice. Labor
Management Relations (Taft-Hartley) Act of 1947, Pub. L. No. 80-101, § 8(b), 61"Stat. 136
(codified at 29 U.S.C. § 158(b) (1976)).
", See Emporium Capwell Co. v. Western Addition Community Org., 420 U.S. 50,
62-65 (1975).
The minority's rights, however, are protected from majority abuse in three ways. First,
the bargaining powers of authorized representatives are confined to a "'unit appropriate'
for the purposes of collective bargaining.'" Chemical Workers Local 1 v. Pittsburgh Plate
Glass Co., 404 U.S. 157, 171 (1971) (quoting 29 U.S.C. § 159(a) (1970)). Second, the
Labor-Management Reporting and Disclosure (Landrum-Griffin) Act of 1959, Pub. L. No.
89-216, 79 Stat. 888 (codified in scattered subsections of 29 U.S.C.) created substantive
provisions insuring internal union democracy. See Emporium Capwell, 420 U.S. at 65. Finally, and perhaps most significant, the union's duty of fair representation extends to all
bargaining unit members and not just the politically successful majority. See text accompanying notes 120-27 infra.
"l Section 9(a) of the NLRA establishes the statutory basis for the exclusive representation principle:
Representatives designated or selected for the purposes of collective bargaining
by the majority of the employees in a unit appropriate for such purposes, shall be the
exclusive representatives of allthe employees in such unit for the purposes of collective bargaining in respect to rates of pay, wages, hours of employment, or other
conditions of employment.
29 U.S.C. § 159(a) (1976) (emphasis added).
17 Emporium Capwell Co. v. Western Addition Community Org., 420 U.S. 50, 62
(1975); accord NLRB v. Allis-Chalmers Mfg. Co., 388 U.S. 175, 180 (1967); Vaca v. Sipes,
386 U.S. 171, 182 (1967); J.I. Case Co. v. NLRB, 321 U.S. 332, 338-39 (1944).
"aFord Motor Co. v. Huffman, 345 U.S. 330, 338 (1953).
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Collective bargaining was further strengthened by section
8(d) of the Act, 19 which defines the scope of the duty to bargain:
For the purposes of this section, to bargain collectively is
the performance of the mutual obligation of the employer and
the representative of the employees to meet at reasonable times
and confer in good faith with respect to wages, hours, and
other terms and conditions of employment, or the negotiation
of an agreement, or any question arising thereunder, and the
execution of a written contract incorporating any agreement
reached if requested by either party, but such obligation does
not compel either party to agree to a proposal or require the
making of a concession .... 20
The courts and the National Labor Relations Board (NLRB) have
broadly interpreted the terms "wages," "hours," and "other terms
and conditions of employment." Most subjects concerning the
employment relationship between employees and their employer
are labelled by the courts and Board as mandatory subjects of
bargaining; both management and labor are required to bargain
about these subjects in good faith. 21 When either party fails to
abide by this statutory obligation, the other may obtain relief from
22
the NLRB or, in appropriate cases, the courts.

I

29 U.S.C. § 158(d) (1976).

20

Id.

21 NLRB v. Wooster Div. of Borg-Warner Corp., 356 U.S. 342, 348-49 (1958). See
generally R. GORMAN, BASIC TExT ON LABOR LAW 496-531 (1976).
The duty to bargain extends only to mandatory subjects of bargaining. This duty does
not include non-mandatory or "permissive" bargaining subjects. Permissive subjects typically concern the relationship between either the employer and a third person or the union
and its employee members. Although they may be incorporated into the labor agreement,
the parties are not obligated to discuss a non-mandatory provision, nor may a party bargain to impasse on a non-mandatory subject. Wooster Div., 356 U.S. at 349; GORMAN, supra,
at 498, 523.
22 In refusal to bargain cases, the Board usually orders the recalcitrant party to cease
and desist its unlawful conduct and to bargain in good faith. In appropriate cases, the
Board may order the offending party to sign a contract, pay backpay to employees, reinstitute an operation improperly terminated without bargaining, or employ other "make
whole" remedies. See generally GORMAN, supra note 21, at 532-39.
When a party unilaterally abrogates a provision of a labor agreement, the wronged
party may file an unfair labor practice charge with the Board, sue directly in court, or, if
the labor agreement contains a grievance-arbitration procedure, sue to compel arbitration
or enforcement of an arbitrator's award. See notes 110-19 and accompanying text infra.

1981]

COLLECTIVE BARGAINING/FLSA

B. Insuring Minimum Living Standards Through the Wage-Hour Law
Commentators have described the Fair Labor Standards Act
as the "original anti-poverty law." 23 Congress designed the Act
to eliminate unfair competition based on labor conditions detrimental to a worker's minimum living standard. 2 4 Substandard
wages were raised to a statutory minimum and employment opportunities were spread to more workers by requiring overtime
pay for hours worked in excess of the statutory maximum. 2 5 Section 206 of the FLSA prescribes a statutory minimum wage for
employers and employees covered by the statute.2 6 Section 207
requires overtime pay calculated at one and one-half times the
regular rate for covered employees working longer than forty
hours per week.2 7 The "regular rate" includes "all remuneration
for employment paid to, or on behalf of, the employee," with cer-

23 Willis, The Evolution Of The FairLabor Standards Act, 26 U. MIAMI L. REV. 607 (1972).
For general discussions of the purposes and functions of the FLSA, see H. WECHT,
WAGE-HOUR LAW (1951): L. WEINER, FEDERAL WAGE AND HOUR LAw (1977); Dodd,
The Supreme Court and Fair Labor Standards, 1941-1945, 59 HARV. L. REV. 321 (1946);
Foster,Jurisdiction, Rights, and Remedies For Group Wrongs Under the Fair Labor StandardsAct:
Special Federal Questions, 1975 Wis. L. REV. 295, 303; Comment, Standards of Wilfulness
Under the Fair Labor Standards Act, 78 MIcH. L. REV. 626 (1980); Comment, Overtime Provisions of the FLSA: Unexpected Liability and Windfall Recovery, 12 J. MAR. J. PRAC. & PRO. 581
(1979).
Critics today, however, have questioned whether the FLSA truly achieves these various
antipoverty goals. See note 11 supra; notes 262-63 and accompanying text infra.
24 The congressional declaration of policy provides:
(a) The Congress finds that the existence, in industries engaged in commerce or in the production of goods for commerce, of labor conditions detrimental to the maintenance of the minimum standard of living necessary for
health, efficiency, and general well-being of workers (1) causes commerce and
the channels and instrumentalities of commerce to be used to spread and perpetuate such labor conditions among the workers of the several States; (2) burdens commerce and the free flow of goods in commerce; (3) constitutes an
unfair method of competition in commerce; (4) leads to labor disputes burdening and obstructing commerce and the free flow of goods in commerce; and (5)
interferes with the orderly and fair marketing of goods in commerce. That
Congress further finds that the employment of persons in domestic service in
households affects commerce.
(b) It is declared to be the policy of this chapter, through the exercise by Congress of its power to regulate commerce among the several States and with
foreign nations, to correct and as rapidly as practicable to eliminate the conditions
above referred to in such industries without substantially curtailing employment or earning power.
29 U.S.C. § 202(a)-(b) (1976) (emphasis added).
25 See Walling v. Helmerich & Payne, Inc., 323 U.S. 37, 40 (1944); Overnight Motor
Transp. Co. v. Missel, 316 U.S. 572, 576-78 (1942).
26 29 U.S.C. § 206(a)(1) (1976). The minimum wage in 1981 is $3.35.
27 29 U.S.C. § 207(a) (1976).
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tain statutory exclusions.28 The Act also sought to remove goods
manufactured with oppressive child labor from interstate commerce. 29 In 1963, Congress amended the FLSA with the Equal
Pay Act to prohibit wage discrimination based on sex.30
The Secretary of Labor, the Secretary's delegee (the WageHour Administrator) and private individuals share responsibility
for enforcing the FLSA. The Wage-Hour Administrator conducts
periodic investigations of employers for FLSA compliance. Along
with his general investigatory power, the Administrator may inspect and transcribe records and interview employees.3" The
Secretary of Labor is empowered to supervise the payment of
back wages. 3 2 Employees may sue as individuals or as groups to
recover unpaid wages and to obtain liquidated damages, attorneys'
fees, and costs for FLSA violations. 33 If employees permit the
Secretary to supervise the voluntary payment of unpaid wages,
they waive their statutory right to sue for liquidated damages, attorneys' fees and costs. 34 Employee permission, however, is not a
prerequisite for a suit brought by the Secretary of Labor. The
Secretary may sue to recover unpaid wages and liquidated damages or petition for a wage order in an injunction suit without any
specific request or grant of permission from the affected
an employee's
employees. 3 5 A suit by the Secretary terminates
36
damages.
liquidated
recover
right to sue and

28 29 U.S.C. § 207(e) (1976). Although its coverage is extensive, the FLSA is riddled
with exemptions from the overtime and minimum wage requirements. See 29 U.S.C. § 213
(1976 & Supp. 11 1978, Supp. III 1979); note 40 infra. For exemptions from the "regular
rate," which is used to calculate overtime pay, see 29 U.S.C. § 207(e) (1976).
29 See 29 U.S.C. § 212 (1976); note 11 supra. "'Oppressive child labor'" is defined in
the Act as the employment of children below ages specified by either statute or administrative regulations for various types of work. See 29 U.S.C. § 203(1) (1976).
30 Equal Pay Act of 1963, Pub. L. No. 88-38, 77 Stat. 56 (codified at 29 U.S.C. § 206(d)
(1976)). Equal work is measured by similarities in "skill, effort, ... responsibility, and ...
working conditions." 29 U.S.C. § 206(d)(1) (1976). The Equal Pay Act does, however, permit wage differentials that are based on seniority systems, merit systems, systems measuring
earnings by quantity or quality of production and any factor other than sex. Id. This Article argues that the child labor and equal pay provisions of the FLSA should continue to
override contrary arrangements contained in individual employment contracts and collective bargaining agreements. See note 206 and accompanying text infra.
31 29 U.S.C. § 211 (1976).
32 29 U.S.C. § 216(c) (1976).
33 29 U.S.C. § 216(b) (1976).
34 29 U.S.C. § 216(c) (1976).
35 29 U.S.C. §§ 216(c), 217 (1976).
36 29 U.S.C. § 216(b) (1976). For an excellent discussion of governmental and private
remedies under the FLSA, see Foster, supra note 23, at 309-338.
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C. Interplay Between the NLRA and the FLSA
Many workers are protected by both the NLRA and the
FLSA.37 Because labor unions have organized many such
employees, 38 the potential for conflict is great. Certain employees,
however, are protected by one statute but not the other. For
example, supervisors, who are specifically excluded from NLRA
coverage, may receive the benefits of FLSA coverage. 3.11 On the

37 The NLRA defines "employee" as follows:
The term "employee" shall include any employee, and shall not be limited
to the employees of a particular employer, unless this subchapter explicitly
states otherwise, and shall include any individual whose work has ceased as a
consequence of, or in connection with any current labor dispute or because of
any unfair labor practice, and who has not obtained any other regular and
substantially equivalent employment, but shall not include any individual employed
as an agricultural laborer, or in the domestic service of any family or person at
his home, or any individual employed by his parent or spouse, or any individual having the status of an independent contractor, or any individual
employed as a supervisor, or any individual employed by an employer subject
to the Railway Labor Act, as amended from time to time, or by any other
person who is not an employer as herein defined.
29 U.S.C. § 152(3) (1976) (emphasis added). The NLRA applies only where labor disputes
affect interstate commerce. Nash v. Florida Indus. Comm'n, 389 U.S. 235, 237-38 (1967);
Alabama State Fed'n of Labor v. McAdory, 325 U.S. 450, 464 (1945).
Although the FLSA's definition of employee is slightly more complex, it essentially
overlaps the NLRA definition. The FLSA initially defines employee to include "any individual employed by an employer." 29 U.S.C. § 203(e)(1) (1976). The minimum wage and
overtime provisions, however, specifically apply to "employees who in any workweek [are]
engaged in commerce or in the production of goods for commerce, or [are] employed in
an enterprise engaged in commerce or in the production of goods for commerce." 29
U.S.C. § 206(a) (Supp. III 1979) (minimum wage). Cf. 29 U.S.C. § 207(a) (1)-(2) (1976)
(similar language for overtime requirement). Thus, the common definition of employee
and the common relationship to interstate commerce provide a large degree of overlap
between these two statutes.
38 According to the United States Bureau of Labor Statistics, 20.3% of the totl work
force and 24.5% of the non-agricultural work force was unionized in 1976. BUREAU
OF LABOR STATIsTIcs, DEPARTMENT OF LABOR, DIRECTORY OF NATIONAL UNIONS AND EM-

PLOYEE ASSOCIATIONS, 1977 61, tab. 6 (1979). Overall union membership decreased 1.4% be-

tween 1974 and 1976 from about 20.2 million to about 19.6 million. Id.
31'The NLRA defines "supervisor" as follows:
The term "supervisor" means any individual having authority in the interest of the employer, to hire, transfer, suspend, lay off, recall, promote, discharge, assign, reward, or discipline other employees, or responsibly to direct
them, or to adjust their grievances, or effectively to recommend such action, if
in connection with the foregoing the exercise of such authority is not of a
merely routine or clerical nature, but requires the use of independent judgment.
29 U.S.C. § 152(11) (1976). Supervisors are not exempted from FLSA coverage unless they
can also qualify as an executive, administrative, or professional employee. See 29 U.S.C.
§ 213(a)(1) (1976). Although a union cannot insist that the bargaining unit include supervisors, the NLRA permits employers to agree to their inclusion. 29 U.S.C. § 164(a) (1976).
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other hand, executive, administrative, and professional employees
are exempted from the FLSA's minimum wage and overtime pay
requirements 40 but may be included in a bargaining unit approved under the NLRA.4 t
The interplay between the FLSA and the NLRA, although
not exhaustive, is considerable. Accompanying every collective
bargaining relationship is the obligation to bargain over the fundamental issues of wages and hours. This obligation is necessarily
affected or influenced by the minimum wage and maximum hour
provisions of the FLSA. Controversies between the parties to a
labor agreement over wages and hours are usually resolved
through contractual grievance procedures that often culminate in
final and binding arbitration. 42 Neither the union nor the
employer may obtain independent judicial review of a controversy
that falls within the ambit of their collectively bargained grievance
procedure without first exhausting those procedures. 43 The union's authority to negotiate agreements and process grievances
under the collective bargaining agreement is similarly protected.
Unless the union breaches its duty of fair representation, an
employee may not obtain judicial review of either the union's or
the employer's conduct until he exhausts the contract grievance
procedures and the applicable intraunion remedies. 44
In spite of our national labor policy's deference to collectively
negotiated and administered labor contracts, the lower courts
have recently created additional, but ill-conceived, exceptions to
the exclusivity, exhaustion, and finality principles, reasoning that
these doctrines have no application when FLSA issues are raised.
These newly-fashioned exceptions do not properly resolve conflicts between the NLRA and the FLSA. Early Supreme Court de"0 29 U.S.C. § 213(a)(1) (1976). 29 U.S.C. § 213(b) (Supp. III 1979) contains the statutory exemptions from the overtime pay requirements. These exemptions include many
significant (railroad employees) and many insignificant (maple syrup producers) occupations. Students, apprentices, and handicapped workers are at least partially exempt from
the minimum wage provisions. 29 U.S.C. § 214 (1976 & Supp. III 1979).
4 See 29 U.S.C. §§ 152(12), 159(b) (1976); cf. NLRB v. Yeshiva Univ., 444 U.S. 672,
681-82 (1980) (although professional employees covered by NLRA, an exemption may
apply based on their status as supervisors or managers).
42 Approximately 98% of major collective bargaining agreements (those covering 1000
or more workers) contain grievance procedures that provide for arbitration of disputes. See
BUREAU OF LABOR STATISTICS, CHARACTERISTICS OF MAJOR COLLECTIVE BARGAINING AGREE1, 1978 105, tab. 8.1 (1980). See generally M. BERNSTEIN, PRIVATE DISPUTE

MENTS, JANUARY

SETTLEMENT 271-72 (1968).
4 See notes 113-27 and accompanying text infra.
4 See notes 120-27 and accompanying text infra. The Supreme Court will soon consider
whether an employer can raise as a defense in a § 301(a) suit the employee's failure to
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cisions, pertinent legislative history, and later amendments to the
FLSA demonstrate that the FLSA must yield to collectively
negotiated agreements.
II
EARLY JUDICIAL RESOLUTION OF THE INTERPLAY BETWEEN THE

NLRA AND THE FLSA

The pre-1947 Supreme Court decisions addressing the significance of unionization and the FLSA fall into two broad
categories. The first, known as the portal-to-portal cases, dealt
with compensable working time under the FLSA. The second
category of cases concerned the method of computing overtime
for compensable work.
A. The Compensable Working-Time Decisions
45
In Tennessee Coal, Iron & Railroad Co. v. Muscoda Local 123,
the Court considered for the first time the meaning of compensable working time under the FLSA and the effect of a collective
bargaining agreement that failed to incorporate the FLSA's compensable working time standard. Tennessee Coal brought an action for declaratory relief against Muscoda Local 123 to determine
whether time spent by iron ore miners traveling underground to
and from the "portal" of the mine to the "working face" 46 constituted compensable time under the FLSA. 4 7 Emphasizing the

exhaust intraunion remedies. See Clayton v. ITT Gilfillan, 104 L.R.R.M. 2118 (9th Cir.
Apr. 14, 1980), cert. granted, 49 U.S.L.W. 3322 (Nov. 3, 1980) (No. 80-54).
41 321 U.S. 590 (1944).
" The "working face" is the place in the mine where the miners actually drill and load
ore. The "face to face" basis of compensation, advocated by the employer, included only
the time spent at the working face. The "portal-to-portal" basis, proposed by the union and
the Wage-Hour Administrator, included time spent traveling between the "portal," or entrance to the mine, and the working face, as well as the time spent at the working face. Id.
at 592 n.2.
" After May 5, 1941, the employer had paid its miners for travel time pursuant to a
labor agreement that complied with the Wage-Hour Administrator's opinion that underground travel in iron ore mines was compensable work under the Act. Id. at 592 n.3; see
note 70 infra. The dispute before the Court involved only employment during the period
between the effective date of the Act (October 24, 1938) and the date the suit was initiated
(April 1941). Id. at 592.
The Wage-Hour Administrator was allowed to intervene in this suit on behalf of the
union. On March 17, 1941, the Administrator approved an informal report based on an
investigation of the "hours worked" in underground metal mines in the United States. The
report concluded that "[tihe workday in underground metal mining starts when the miner
reports for duty as required at or near the collar [portal] of the mine and ends when he
reaches the collar at the end of the shift." Id. at 600 (brackets in original).
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"remedial and humanitarian" purpose of the Act, the Court held
that because travel time from the mine's portal to its working face
and back again benefitted the employer, it was compensable
under the FLSA, even though the travel was not directly productive.4 8 The Court rejected Tennessee Coal's arguments, based on
existing collective bargaining agreements and "immemorial custom", that only time spent underground at the coal face was work
time, because the district court had not specifically found that any
such custom or collective provision existed. 4 ' Even if such findings had been made, they would not have affected the decision.
The Court noted that pre-FLSA customs and agreements were
established during an era of company-dominated unions rather
than through free collective bargaining. Consequently, they bore
little legal significance to the question before the Court:
Likewise there was substantial, if not conclusive, evidence
that prior to 1938 petitioners recognized no independent labor
unions and engaged in no bona fide collective bargaining with
an eye toward reaching agreements on the workweek. Contracts
with company-dominated unions and discriminatory actions toward the
independent unions are poor substitutesfor "contractsfairly arrived at
through the process of collective bargaining."

But in any event it is immaterial that there may have been
a prior custom or contract not to consider certain work within
the compass of the workweek or not to compensate employees
for certain portions of their work. The Fair Labor Standards Act
was not designed to codify or perpetuate those customs and contracts
which allow an employer to claim all of an employee's time while compensating him for only a part of it. Congress intended, instead to

achieve a uniform national policy of guaranteeing compensation for all work or employment engaged in by employees covered by the Act. Any custom or contract falling short of that basic
policy, like an agreement to pay less than the minimum wage requirements, cannot be utilized to deprive employees of their statutory rights.50
48

Id. at 597-99.
at 600-01.

49 Id.

50 Id. at 601-03 (footnote omitted) (emphasis added). The Court also noted:
Congress was not unaware of the effect that collective bargaining contracts
might have on overtime pay. It expressly decided to give effect to two kinds of
collective agreements, as specified in § 7(b)(1) and (2) of the Act. Cf. § 8(c). It
thus did not intend that other collective agreements should relieve employers
from paying for overtime in excess of an actual workweek of 40 hours, regardless of the provisions of such contracts.
Id. at 602 n.18.
Justices Frankfurter and Jackson filed separate concurring opinions. Justice Frankfurter agreed with the Court's holding affirming the lower court's judgment because there
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Although its holding applied only to pre-FLSA agreements that
were not produced by free collective bargaining, the Court, in unfortunate dicta, implied that all collective bargaining agreements
were invalid if they did not strictly comply with FLSA standards
of compensable working time.
The next Court decision addressing the significance of unionization in an FLSA context -Brooklyn
Savings Bank v.
O'Neil'-did not involve a compensable work issue. This case is
important, however, because it contains the Court's first analysis
of the FLSA's legislative history on the unionization issue-an
analysis that the Court rejected a short time later in a compensable work case. The Court considered whether an employee's acceptance of a check tendered by the employer for overtime pay
owed under the FLSA and the employee's execution of a release
of any FLSA claims and damages barred a subsequent action for
liquidated damages.5 2 Based on the policy considerations under-

was no evidence that Congress intended to give the term "workweek", as applied to the
mining industry, a technical meaning. Id. at 603-04. Similarly, Justice Jackson accepted the
Court's holding because the evidence disclosed no industry custom limiting compensable
work to time spent at the coal face. Id. at 605.
Justice Roberts, joined by Chief Justice Stone, dissented. Recognizing the unfortunate implications of the Court's opinion on collective bargaining, Justice Roberts prefaced his dissent by emphasizing that the statutory purposes of the FLSA were limited to
increasing employment, providing a fair day's pay for a fair day's work, reducing the average workweek, and preventing unfair competition by correcting inequalities in the cost of
goods produced with subminimum wage labor. Id. at 606-07.
Justice Roberts argued that compensable work time could vary among industries, depending on the nature of the industry and the understandings of the parties. Id. at 608.
Disputing the district court's findings of fact, Justice Roberts cited the previous attempts by
the miners' union formally to obtain compensation for travel time, noting that no agreement had ever been reached. Id. at 610. Justice Roberts also disagreed with the Court's
characterization of the union as employer-dominated; he observed that the union had been
affiliated with the Congress of Industrial Organizations (CIO) before the FLSA's enactment.
Accordingly, Justice Roberts attached little significance to the district court's finding that
the union had not been certified by the National Labor Relations Board. Id. at 610-11, 615.
Justice Roberts concluded by objecting to the district court's failure to find that compensation had historically been paid only for face-to-face work, id. at 616, arguing that the FLSA
was not intended to designate as "work" those employee activities that neither employer
nor employee considered work. Id. at 617.
•,'324 U.S. 697 (1945).
52 Id. at 701. The Court actually decided three cases in this consolidated action. In the
first, Brooklyn Savings Bank paid statutory overtime compensation to an employee in return for his release of all FLSA rights. Because the sum paid by the bank did not include
an amount for liquidated damages, which are recoverable under the Act, the employee
sued. In the second case, the employer tendered a check for $500 to an employee for
wages owed under the Act. In return, the employee released the employer from all statutory claims. Both the employer and the employee were aware, however, that more than
$500 was due for minimum wages and overtime under the Act. After obtaining counsel,
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lying the FLSA, the Court held that an individual employee could
not waive the'Act's minimum wage, overtime, and liquidated
damages provisions by signing a release tendered by his
5
employer. 3
Individual waivers or releases of FLSA claims were not considered by Congress either in the text of the statute or in the
legislative reports and debates. 54 Thus, the Court analyzed the
general legislative policies behind the Wage-Hour law to answer
the waiver question:
The legislative history of the Fair Labor Standards Act shows
an intent on the part of Congress to protect certain groups of
the population from substandard wages and excessive hours
which endangered the national health and well-being and the
free flow of goods in interstate commerce. The statute was a
recognition of the fact that due to the unequal bargaining
power as between employer and employee, certain segments of
the population from sub-standard wages and excessive hours
vent private contracts on their part which endangered national
health and efficiency and as a result the free movement of
goods in interstate commerce. 55
In a footnote, the Court further explained that Congress enacted
the FLSA to benefit the nonunionized, poorly paid worker: "The
legislative debates indicate that the prime purpose of the legislation was to aid the unprotected, unorganized and lowest paid of
the nation's working population; that is, those employees who
lacked sufficient bargaining power to secure for themselves a
minimum subsistence wage." 5'
The Court concluded that
employees could not waive these statutory rights because it would
encourage and empower employers to frustrate the FLSA's general
policy of combatting substandard wages and excessive hours for
57
unorganized workers.
the employee sued for the balance of statutory wages due under the Act and for liquidated
damages. The third case presented the related issue of whether an employee could recover
interest on unpaid statutory overtime and liquidated damages.
53 Id. at 707.
54 Id. at 705-06. The Court prefaced this discussion by noting the general rule that
statutory rights conferred on a private party but affecting the public interest are unwaivable if the waiver violates the statutory policy. Id. at 704.
• Id. at 706-07.
-6 Id. at 707 n. 18.
5' Id. at 712-13. The court recognized, however, that a number of other statutes containing express provisions relating to waiver or settlement of claims have been strictly interpreted to protect the employee. Id. at 712 n.29. Chief Justice Stone and Justices Roberts
and Frankfurter dissented from the Court's opinion because it completely prohibited the
employer from obtaining a release of statutory liquidated damages. Id. at 719.
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Despite the general policy recognized in Brooklyn Savings
Bank emphasizing the application of the FLSA to unorganized
workers, the Court held barely two months later in Jewell Ridge
Coal Corp. v. Mine Workers Local 6167 " that the FLSA's compensable time provisions superseded a contrary scheme collectively
bargained by a powerful union on behalf of highly paid
employees. ,: The Court granted certiorari in Jewell Ridge Coal to
determine whether time spent traveling between the portal and
the working face in bituminous coal mines was compensable
under the FLSA. Although the Court acknowledged that working
conditions were better than those in Tennessee Coal, it applied Tennessee Coal because portal to working face travel required mental
exertion by employees that was controlled by their employer for
his benefit.'" Rejecting the employer's reliance on fifty years of
universal custom and a bona fide collective bargaining agreement,
the Court invoked the Tennessee Coal dictum prohibiting agreements that "'allow an employer to claim all of an employee's time
while compensating him only for a part of it.' "61 The majority
argued that the statutory goals of increasing employment opportunities and adequately compensating employees for their work
required literal enforcement of the FLSA's compensable time notions, whether or not the employees were highly paid and represented by a strong union." -

58 325 U.S. 161 (1945).
59 Id. at 167-69.
60 Id.

at 163-66.
61 Id. at 167 (quoting Tennessee Coal, Iron & R.R. v. Muscoda Local 123, 321 U.S.

590, 602 (1944)); see text accompanying note 50 supra.
The Court noted, as it had in Tennessee Coal, that it was not concerned about the use
of "bona fide contracts or customs to settle difficult and doubtful questions as to whether
certain activity or non-activity constitutes work." Id. at 169-70. See also Armour & Co. v.
Wantock, 323 U.S. 126 (1944). The majority apparently decided that "bona fide" disputes
concerning compensable working time are limited to situations where there is difficulty in
computing actual working time as opposed to situations where travel time is arranged or
arbitrarily fixed. 325 U.S. at 169-70.
62 Id.

at 167.

The Court dismissed as "indecisive" statements in the legislative history indicating
that the FLSA was not designed to interfere with collective bargaining. Id. at 168. However, the Court quoted a passage from the legislative history concerning the effect of the
FLSA on collective bargaining agreements indicating that the FLSA does not affect collective bargaining agreements unless the wage rates in the agreement were below statutory
minimums. Id. at 168 n.1; see 81 CONG. REc. 7650 (1937) (remarks of Sen. Black concerning the Wage-Hour Board, which was the administrative agency originally envisioned to
enforce the FLSA, but was later replaced in the statute by the Wage-Hour Administrator in
the Department of Labor).
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Justice Jackson, writing for the four dissenting Justices, attacked the majority's refusal to defer to the agreements between
the "strong and powerful" United Mine Workers (UMW) and the
employers that were based on a half century of custom in the
industry." 3 He distinguished the Tennessee Coal labor agreements
on the ground that they had been bargained by companydominated unions," 4 and emphasized the uniformly high wages
and seven hour workdays negotiated by the UMW. 5 Because the
labor agreements had been produced by bona fide collective bargaining, the dissenters argued that the majority's holding conflicted with the employer's obligation under the NLRA to honor
agreements made with the employees' bargaining representatives.66
Justice Jackson also cited "multiple examples" of Congress's
" 'continuing intention not to interfere with the process of collective bargaining' " in the FLSA's legislative history." One such
example was the report of the Senate Committee on Education
and Labor:
The right of an individual or collective employees to bargain with their employers concerning wages and hours is recognized and encouraged by this bill. It is not intended that this
law shall invade the right of employer and employee to fix their
own contracts of employment, wherever there can be any real,
genuine bargaining between them. It is only those low-wage
and long-working-hour industrial workers, who are helpless vic-

The passage quoted by the Court, which is apparently the only passage in the legislative history indicating that the FLSA could override collective bargaining agreements, does
not support the Court's holding. In that passage, Senator Black also stated:
[Tihe Board would have jurisdiction to [set the agreement aside], but under the
provisions of the law it would be my judgment that the Board would be very
reluctant, indeed, to attempt to interfere with a bona-fide agreement made between employer and employee.
325 U.S. at 168 n.1 (quoting 81 CONG. REC. 7650 (1937)). Thus, the legislative history
on which the Court relied would permit judicial interference with collective bargaining
only when the agreement did not provide statutory minimum wages.
63 Id. at 171-74.
64 Id. at 174. Quoting from the district court's opinion, the dissent underscored the
difference between the instant case and Tennessee Coal, where " 'the efforts of the men to
organize their union presentted] a pitiable picture of helplessness against the domination
of the mining companies.'" Id. at 174-75 (quoting 53 F. Supp. 935, 948 (1944)).
65 Id. at 173.
66 Id. at 172. See NLRB v. American Nat'l Ins. Co., 343 U.S. 395 (1952); J.I. Case Co.
v. NLRB, 321 U.S. 332 (1944).
67 325 U.S. at 176 (quoting the district court's opinion, 53 F. Supp. 935, 944 (1944)).
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tims of their own bargaining weakness, that this bill seeks to
assist to obtain a minimum wage. 68

Legislative history also demonstrates that Congress respected
specific requests by the UMW to refrain from enacting provisions

6' Id. at 176 (quoting S. REP. No. 884, 75th Cong., 1st Sess. 3-4 (1937)). See also Joint
Hearings Before the Senate Comm. on Labor and Education and the House Comm. on Labor, 75th
Cong., Ist Sess. 46-47 (1937) (statement of Ass't Atty. Gen. Jackson); id. at 181-83 (colloquy
between Sec'y of Labor Perkins and Sen. Walsh); id. at 689-708 (statement of Mr. Fletcher).
Mr. Fletcher's statement demonstrates that Congress considered, but did not enact, a proposal to exempt railroad employees from the FLSA. His proposal, which suggested that
wage claims would be protected under the grievance procedures of the Railway Labor Act
(RLA), was rejected because the RLA grievance procedures were not adequate to protect
non-unionized railroad employees. Id.
Justice jackson retreated somewhat from the breadth of the Senate committee's declaration. He noted later in his opinion that "no agreement could be validly bargained which
provided for less than the minimum wages to be fixed by the proposed [Wage-Hour]
Board or for more than the specified hours of labor." Id. at 177. Justice Jackson supported
this argument by citing the same passage from the Senate debate relied on by the majority
that outlined the proposed Wage-Hour Board's authority to set minimum wages. Id. at
176-77; see note 62 supra.
Justice Jackson also quoted, however, several of the "numerous passages" from the
legislative history indicating that Congress never intended the FLSA to interfere with bona
fide collective bargaining:
Mrs. Norton.... It is not the intention of this amendment, or of the bill,
to start fixing wages in all industries but only in those in which oppressive
wages are being paid to a substantial portion of workers.... [82 CONG. REC.
1391 (1937) (remarks of Rep. Norton).]
Mr. Randolph .... It [the bill] is not concernedwith thatfortunatemajorityof the laboring
classes whose collective bargainingpower is sufficiently potent to insure the preservationof their
industrial rights.
But it is concerned with those millions in industry who are unprotected
and unorganized.... [82 CONG. REC. 1935 (1937) (remarks of Rep. Randolph)
(emphasis added).]
Mr. Curley.... There is no conflict of jurisdiction, under the provisions of
this fair standards of labor bill, and the existing labor organizations of this
country. [83 CONG. REC. 7285 (1938) (remarks of Rep. Curley).]
Mr. Boileau.... What is more, we are preservingfor organized laborits right to
bargain collectively and it will bargainfor a higher wage than that. [83 CONG. REC.
7290 (1938) (remarks of Rep. Boileau (emphasis added).]
Mr. Allen.... This bill has a threefold purpose as I see it. First, it eliminates sweat shops.... The bill does not affect organized labor, but those
5,000,000 American working men and women who have not yet been benefited
by organized labor. [83 CONG. REC. 7291 (1938) (remarks of Rep. Allen) (emphasis added).]
Mr. Fitzgerald.... I would have you observe that this proposed legislation
will not improve the wages and hours of the majority of workers, nor does it
attempt to. For I am greatly pleased to say that the majority of workers do not
need this legislation because they are receiving a living wage and are not forced
to work unreasonable hours. [83 CONG. REC. 7310 (1938) (remarks of Rep.
Fitzgerald).]
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that would usurp collective bargaining in the coal industry.6 ): The
majority opinion was inconsistent with the UMW's recommendation to the Wage-Hour Administrator and the Administrator's
own rulings approving methods for calculating working time on a
70
face-to-face basis.
The dissent's most pointed criticism of the majority's holding
was that it "extends [an advantage] to a powerful group so plainly
outside of the policy of the Act [as contrasted] with the treatment
of groups that, being unprotected and unorganized, were clearly
within it." 71 The Court had previously ruled that determinations
of compensable working time for unorganized workers were subject, in part, to the agreement between the worker and employer,

325 U.S. at 178 n.6 (quoting Jewell Ridge Coal Corp. v. Mine Workers Local 6167, 53 F.
Supp. 935, rev'd 145 F.2d 10 (1944), affd 325 U.S. 161 (1945); see note 56 and accompanying
text supra (legislative history discussed by Justice Reed in Brooklyn Savings Bank). These 1938
remarks parallel the early drafts of the FLSA that included specific provisions preventing the
Act from interfering with collective bargaining unless a union was relatively weak and providing that collectively bargained wages and hours constitute prima facie evidence of FLSA
compatibility. See S. REP. No. 884, 75th Cong., Ist Sess. (1937) (§ 5 Senate bill); H.R. REP.
No. 1452 75th CONG. 1st Sess. (1937) (§ 5(b), (d) House bill). See also 82 CONG. REC. 1390
(1937) (remarks of Rep. Norton).
6:1 325 U.S. at 179-82 (Jackson, J., dissenting). The policy preamble to the Bituminous
Coal Act of 1937, ch. 127, 50 Stat. 72 (repealed 1966), declared that the employees' right
to bargain collectively in the coal industry is protected. In the hearings prior to the
enactment of the FLSA, officials of the UMW testified extensively in favor of collective
bargaining and in opposition to legislation that would set "fair" daily wages in the coal
industry. See Joint Hearings Before the Comm. on Education and Labor, United States Senate and
the Comm. on Labor, House of Representatives, 75th Cong., 1st Sess. 281 (1937). For a discussion of contemporary labor opinions on the FLSA at the time of its enactment, see Forsythe, Legislative History Of The Fair Labor Standards Act, 6 LAw & CONTEMP. PROB. 464,
467-68, 471, 476 (1939). See also Grossman, Fair Labor Standards.Act of 1938: Maximum
Struggle for a Minimum Wage, 101 MON. LAB. REv. 22 (June 1978).
70 325 U.S. at 182 (Jackson, J., dissenting). The dissent quoted a letter from officials of
the United Mine Workers urging the Wage-Hour Administrator to accept the wages,
hours, and definition of working time contained in the industry's Appalachian Agreement
(which embodied the custom and traditions of the bituminous coal mining industry). The
letter recounted the long history of collective bargaining between the UMW and the coal
operators and the existing high wage rates. The letter described the relationship between
the UMW and the coal operators as "collective bargaining in its complete sense." Id. at
183-87 n.9. The dissent also quoted from the July 18, 1940, ruling by the Wage-Hour
Administrator that face-to-face computation of work time in the coal industry was reasonable. Id. at 188.
Justice Jackson also argued that the majority's interpretation would render the government's mining contracts unlawful. "If it is illegal for the operators and the miners by
collective bargaining to agree that there shall be no travel time, it is obviously illegal to
agree that the travel time shall be fixed at any arbitrary figure which does not conform to
the facts." Id. at 191.
"' Id. at 192 (Jackson, J., dissenting).
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but subsequently held in Brooklyn Savings Bank that individual
workers could not waive FLSA rights. 72 In Tennessee Coal, however, the Court approved portal-to-portal pay for a group of organized workers represented by a company-dominated union
notwithstanding a contrary labor agreement, and this holding was
extended in Jewell Ridge Coal to cover a group of strongly represented union workers. Originally intended as a benefit for the
unorganized worker, the Court made portal-to-portal pay available to organized and unorganized workers on the same termseven though the unorganized workers lacked the ability to
negotiate with their employer for other benefits. 3 Observing
that the "ink [was] hardly dry" on Brooklyn Savings Bank's declaration that the FLSA's "prime purpose" was to assist unorganized
workers,7 4 Justice Jackson concluded:
We have just held [in Brooklyn Savings Bank] that the individual
workman is deprived of power to settle such questions.... Now
we hold collective bargaining incompetent to do so. It is hard to
see how the long-range interests of labor itself are advanced by
a holding that there is no mode by which it may bind itself to
any specified future conduct, however fairly bargained. A
genuinely collectively bargained agreement as to wages, hours
or working conditions is not invalidated or superseded by this
Act and both employer and employee should be able to make
and rely upon them, and the courts in deciding such cases
5
7
should honor them.

72 Id. at 192-93 (Jackson, J., dissenting). See Skidmore v. Swift & Co., 323 U.S. 134,
136-37 (1944).
11 The majority's holding eliminated the employer's wage flexibility, to the detriment
of employees:
The "face to face" method, whatever its other defects, is a method by which
both operators and miners have tried to bring about uniformity of labor costs
in the different unionized mines and to remove the operator's resistance to
improved wage scales based on fear of competition. Under this decision there
can be no uniform wage in this industry except by disregarding the very duty
which this decision creates to pay each miner for his actual travel time. Thus,
two men working shoulder to shoulder, but entering the mine at different portals must receive either different amounts of pay ... or must stay at their productive work a different length of time. Thus, too, old mines which have burrowed far from their portals must shoulder greatly increased labor costs per
ton.... Mining labor has tended to locate its dwellings near its work, and the
closing of mines results in corresponding dislocations.
Id. at 194-95 (Jackson, J., dissenting).
74 Id. at 192.
75 Id. at 195. A contemporary commentator also struggled with the roughshod treat-

ment given to collective bargaining agreements in Tennessee Coal and Jewell Ridge Coal. See
Dodd, supra note 23, at 352-55, 362-67, 371.

214

CORNELL LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 66:193

B. The Overtime Pay Decisions
The Court decided several overtime pay cases76 after Jewell
Ridge Coal. In these decisions, which involved several collectively
bargained overtime compensation schemes, the Court gave cursory consideration to the significance of the collective bargaining
agreements. 77 The FLSA's impact on a collective bargaining
76 After the decision in Jewell Ridge Coal, the Court issued one additional significant
compensable working time decision. In Anderson v. Mt. Clemens Pottery Co., 328 U.S. 680
(1946), the Court held that certain preliminary activities, such as putting on aprons and
overalls, removing shirts, taping or greasing arms, putting on finger cots, preparing
equipment for productive work, turning on switches for lights and machinery, opening
windows, and assembling and sharpening tools, were compensable work under Tennessee
Coal andJewell Ridge Coal. The Court reasoned that these activities involved physical exertion controlled or required by the employer for the employer's benefit. Moreover, because
the activities were performed solely on the employer's premises and were necessary prerequisites to productive labor, they constituted compensable work. Id. at 692-93. The
Portal-to-Portal Act of 1947 overturned both the Mt. Clemens Pottery and Jewell Ridge Coal
decisions. See notes 91-93 and accompanying text infra.
11 In Walling v. Harnischfeger Corp., 325 U.S. 427 (1945), the Court held that an
employer could not exclude incentive bonuses from the statutory "regular rate of pay"
which is the basis for computing overtime pay under the FLSA. In rejecting the employer's
contention that the employees' contractual base rate should be equated with the statutory
regular rate, the Court dismissed the collective bargaining agreement's significance with the
maxim that "actual payments," and not contract nomenclature, should control. 325 U.S. at
430-31. Chief Justice Stone emphasized in his dissent that the wage arrangement had been
achieved by collective bargaining. The employees were enjoying higher wages under this
arrangement than they would working at the prevailing hourly rates of pay with time and
one-half for overtime as required by FLSA. Id. at 434. Chief Justice Stone provided his
own standard for testing collectively bargained wage arrangements against the FLSA:
It is enough that the weekly wage is ... mutually agreed upon in good faith,
that it is intended to pay for time and overtime, and that it is sufficient in
amount to pay for the first forty hours at a rate above the minimum wage
prescribed by the statute and to pay for the overtime at one and one-half times
that rate.
Id. at 439.
In Martino v. Michigan Window Cleaning Co., 327 U.S. 173 (1946), the Court considered a similar compensation arrangement providing overtime pay only for hours worked in
excess of 44 per week. The Court noted in passing that a collective bargaining agreement
was involved but, in purported reliance on Brooklyn Savings Bank, held that the contract did
not bar the employees' right to recover statutory overtime. Id. at 177-78. The Court struck
down another compensation formula contained in a collective bargaining agreement that
inconsistently applied rates for base pay and overtime pay in 149 Madison Ave. Corp. v.
Asselta, 331 U.S. 199, 202 (1947). The Court reached its result without addressing the
policy concerns underlying collective bargaining and their proper relationship to the FLSA.
Justice Frankfurter suggested that the decisions in 149 Madison Ave. and Harnisckfeger
were properly decided but for the wrong reasons. Bay Ridge Operating Co. v. Aaron, 334
U.S. 446, 488-89 (1948) (Frankfurter, J., dissenting). Where the collective bargaining
agreement either mislabels the true circumstances of the employment relationship or fails
to distinguish between "basic" hours and "overtime" hours, he argued that courts should
not allow the labels attached by the parties to conceal the "true facts." Id. This circumstance
is easily remedied, however, without completely usurping collective bargaining agreements
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agreement was not addressed in detail until the Court's decision
in Bay Ridge Operating Co. v. Aaron.7 8 In Bay Ridge, a collective
bargaining agreement between the International Longshoremen's
Association and several stevedoring companies provided for
"straight time hourly rates" for work done within a prescribed
forty-four hour time schedule and "overtime hourly rates" at one
and one-half times the contractual straight time rate for all other
hours.79 Numerous employees worked exclusively in the contractual overtime period but the contract provided no additional
80
payment for non-straight time hours worked in excess of forty.
Several of these employees brought a class action under the FLSA
seeking statutory overtime compensation at the rate of one and
one-half times their contractual overtime rate of pay for work
over forty hours. The district court granted judgment for the
employers, emphasizing that the contractual overtime rates had
been produced through bona fide collective bargaining. 8 ' The
Second Circuit reversed. 2
The Supreme Court affirmed in a five-to-three decision, concluding that the contractual overtime arrangement was nothing
more than a shift differential under the FLSA.8 3 The Act required employers to compensate employees at one and one-half
by applying the bad faith standard of the duty of fair representation. See notes 244-53
and accompanying text infra.
During this period, the Court also struck down individual employment contracts that
computed "the [statutory] regular rate of pay in a wholly unrealistic and artificial manner
so as to negate statutory purposes." Walling v. Helmerich & Payne, Inc., 323 U.S. 37, 42
(1944) (split-day plan designating first four hours worked as "base or regular rate" and
second four hours as "overtime" paid at time and one-half regular rate). See also Walling v.
Youngerman-Reynolds Hardware Co., 325 U.S. 419, 425 (1945) (contractual "regular rate"
for overtime calculation below actual hourly earnings under incentive plan held invalid).
78 334 U.S. 446 (1948). The Bay Ridge case is discussed in Dabney & Dabney, Regular
Rate And The Bay Ridge Case: A Guide To Legislative Revisions, 58 YALE LJ. 353 (1949);
Farmer, Overtime On Overtime: The Supreme Court Decision In The Bay Ridge Case, 34 VA. L.
REV. 745, 767 (1948) (criticizing Bay Ridge as providing windfalls to employees, unexpected
financial liability for employers, and disrupting collective bargaining); Sanders, Overtime Pay
Under the FairLabor Standards Act, 2 VAND. L. REV. 379, 389-91 (1949) (Bay Ridge disturbed
collective bargaining relationship, but Congress, not courts, should write exemptions to
FLSA); Note, Overtime on Overtime: Collective Bargainingv. the FairLabor StandardsAct, 16 U.
CM. L. REV. 116 (1948); Comment, 1950 Wis. L. REV. 99.
79 334 U.S. at 451-52. The straight time rate schedule was essentially a day time
schedule, covering the morning hours on Monday through Saturday, and the afternoon
hours on Monday through Friday. Work during all other hours, i.e., night time work, was
compensated at overtime rates. Id.
" The relevant portions of the labor contract are set forth in 334 U.S. at 451-52 n.5.
"1 Addison v. Huron Stevedoring Corp., 69 F. Supp. 956 (S.D.N.Y. 1947).
12 Aaron v. Bay Ridge Operating Co., 162 F.2d 665 (2d Cir. 1947).
83 334 U.S. at 466.
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times their regular rate "for a workweek longer than forty
hours." 8 4 At that time, however, Congress had not defined the
term "regular rate" of pay. The Court held that Congress left this
term undefined because it preferred a 'judicial determination ...
whether . ..an employee receive[d his] full statutory excess compensation, rather than to impose a rule that in the absence of
fi-aud or clear evasion employers and employees might fix a regular rate without regard to hours worked or sums actually received
as pay." 8
The Court then analyzed the compensation scheme in
the labor agreement, citing a previous decision that invalidated
an artificial scheme designed to deprive unorganized employees
of overtime wages: "[f]reedom of contract does not include the
right to compute the regular rate in a wholly unrealistic and artificial manner so as to negate the statutory purposes." 8 6 This
analysis led the Court to hold that:
[T]he regular rate ...must reflect all payments which the parties have agreed shall be received regularly during the workweek,
exclusive of overtime payments. It is not an arbitrary label chosen by the
parties; it is an actualfact. Once the parties have decided upon

the amount of wages and mode of payment the determination
of the regular rate becomes a matter of mathematical computation, the result of which is unaffected by any designation [in the
87
contract to the contrary].

84 Section 7(a) of the FLSA provided that: "No employer shall ...employ any of his
employees ...for a workweek longer than forty hours ...unless such employee receives compensation for his employment in excess of [40] hours at a rate not less than one and
one-half times the regular rate at which he is employed." 52 Stat. 1063 (current version at
29 U.S.C. § 207(a)(1) (1976 & Supp. III 1979)). Although this section has since been renumbered, the current version is essentially the same as that considered by the Bay Ridge
Court. In the 1949 amendments to the FLSA, however, Congress further defined the term
"regular rate of pay." 29 U.S.C. § 207(e) (1976) now provides: "As used in this section the
"regular rate" at which an employee is employed shall be deemed to include all remuneration for employment paid to, or on behalf of, the employee....
85 334 U.S. at 463.
86 Walling v. Helmerich & Payne, Inc., 323 U.S. 37, 42 (1944). The Court also cited
Walling v. Youngerman-Reynolds Hardware Co., 325 U.S. 419, 424-25 (1945). The
Court's reliance on Youngerman-Reynolds was decidedly misplaced. The employer
in Youngerman-Reynolds agreed with his unorganized employees to use a contractudlly
designated rate for calculating overtime. The actual rate of payment received by the
employees was much greater than the stated contractual rate due to an incentive scheme
that was also provided in the contract. Although the employer's failure to base overtime
calculations on the actual rather than the stated rate violated § 7(a) of the FLSA, the
Youngerman-Reynolds decision contained no discussion of the effect of collective bargaining
agreements on the definition of the statutory rate of pay.
87 334 U.S. at 461 (emphasis added).
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The Court then calculated the statutory regular rate of pay by
dividing the employee's contractual "overtime hourly rate" received, i.e., the "regular rate" of pay, by the number of hours
worked. Statutory overtime for workweeks over forty hours was
required at one and one-half times this figure. Although the
Court stated that its computation excluded overtime payments
built into the existing regular rate to avoid "overtime premium on
overtime premium-a pyramiding that Congress could not have
intended,"8 the longshoremen neverthless received overtime on
contractual overtime.
The Court minimized the significance of the collective bargaining agreement and rejected the union's argument supporting
the stevedore companies:
Although our public policy recognizes the effectiveness of collective bargaining and encourages its use, nothing to our
knowledge in any act authorizes us to give decisive weight to
contract declarations as to the regular rate because they are the
result of collective bargaining.... A vigorous argument is presented for petitioners by the International Longshoremens Association that a collectively obtained and administered agreement should be effective in determining the regular rate of pay
but we think the words of and practices under the contract are
the determinative factors in finding the regular rate for each
individual.8 9:
Thus, without considering the FLSA's legislative history and relying on decisions ignoring the importance of a labor agreement in
the FLSA context,/' the majority opinion disregarded the national
policy favoring collective bargaining and woodenly deferred to the
dictates of the FLSA.
C. Legislation Overturning Jewell Ridge Coal and Bay Ridge
The Bay Ridge Court did not rely on its Tennessee Coal and
Jewell Ridge Coal decisions because Congress had overturned them
Id. at 464. The Court stated:
Where an employee receives a higher wage or rate because of undesireable
hours or disagreeable work, such wage represents a shift differential or higher
wages because the character of the work done or the time at which he is required to labor rather than an overtime premium. Such payments enter into
the determination of the regular rate of pay.
Id. at 468-69.
'9 Id. at 463-64. The Court cited two deisions-149 Madison Ave. Corp. v. Asselta, 331
U.S. 199, 204 (1947), and Walling v. Harnischfeger Corp., 325 U.S. 427, 432 (1945)-that
gave cursory treatment to the effect of collective bargaining agreements. See note 77 supra.
" See 334 U.S. at 463-64.
88
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by enacting the Portal-to-Portal Act of 1947.91 Congress described the Jewell Ridge Coal decision as a "serious threat" to the
principle of collective bargaining that created liabilities labor and
management attempted to avoid through collective bargaining.2
Congress eliminated Jewell Ridge's detrimental impact on the process of voluntary collective bargaining "3 and limited judicial interference in compensable work time disputes by prohibiting suits to
recover back pay or time spent "preliminary" or "postliminary" to
the employee's "principle activities.""94
Although the Portal-to-Portal Act nullified judicial decisions
converting noncompensable time into compensable time, the Bay
Ridge Court should have recognized that the congressional proclamation implied from the Portal Act concerning the primacy of
collective bargaining was equally applicable for determining the

"

Pub. L. No. 80-49, 61 Stat. 84 (codified at 29 U.S.C. §§ 251-62 (1976)).
1,2H. REP. No. 71, 80th Cong., 1st Sess. (1947), reprinted in [1947] U.S. CODE CONG. &
AD. NEWS 1029-1036. Along with Tennessee Coal andJewell Ridge Coal, the Supreme Court's
decision in Anderson v. Mt. Clemens Pottery Co., 328 U.S. 680 (1946), was overruled by
the Portal-to-Portal Act because it too imposed unforeseen liabilities on employers.
11 The Portal-to-Portal Act's declaration of policy, codified at 29 U.S.C. § 251(a)-(b)
(1976) (emphasis added), declares:
(a) The Congressfinds that the Fair Labor Standards Act of 1938, as amended.., has
been interpretedjudicially in disregard of long-established customs, practices, and contracts between employers and employees, thereby creating wholly unexpected liabilities,
immense in amount and retroactive in operation, upon employers with the results that, if said Act as so interpreted or claims arising under such interpretations were permitted to stand, (1) the payment of such liabilities would bring
about financial ruin of many employers and seriously impair the capital resources of many others, thereby resulting in the reduction of industrial operations, halting of expansion and development, curtailing employment, and the
earning power of employees; ... (4) employees would receive windfall payments,
including liquidated damages, of sums for activities performed by them without
any expectation of reward beyond that included in their agreed rates of pay;
(5) there would occur the promotion of increasing demand for payment to
employees for engaging in activities no compensation for which had been contemplated by either the employer or employee at the time they were engaged
in; (6) voluntary collective bargaining would be interfered with and industrialdisputes
between employees and employers and between employees and employees would be created;
(7) the courts of the country would be burdened with excessive and needless
litigation and champertous practices would be encouraged....
(b) It is declared to be the policy of the Congress in order to meet the existing
emergency and to correct existing evils (1) to relieve and protect interstate
commerce from practices which burden and obstruct it; (2) to protect the right of
collective bargaining;and (3) to define and limit the jurisdiction of the courts.
See generally Cotter, Portal to Portal Pay, 33 VA. L. REV. 44 (1947); Note, Good Faith
Defenses Under the Portal-to-PortalAct of 1947, 17 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 322 (1949); Note, Fair
Labor Standards Under the Portal to Portal Act, 15 U. CH. L. REV. 352 (1948).
94 29 U.S.C. §§ 252-254 (1976).
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"regular rate" where collective agreements established a regular
rate for computing overtime. This point was not ignored by Justice Frankfurter :5 who, dissenting in Bay Ridge, criticized the
majority for disregarding congressional assurances that the FLSA
would not interfere with free collective bargaining:
Such assurances were necessary to allay the traditional hostility
of organized labor to legislative wage-fixing. The Court now
holds unlawful a collective agreement entered into by a strong
union, governing the wide range of the longshoremen's
employment relationships, and especially designed to restrict
the hours of work and to require the same premium as that
given by the statute for work done outside of normal hours but
within the statutory limit. The Court substitutes an arrangement rejected both by the union and the employers as inimical
to the needs of their industry and subversive of the process of
collective bargaining under which the industry has been carried
on.
The traditional process of collective bargaining was not to
be disturbed where it existed. It was to be extended by advancing the economic position of workers in non-unionized industries and in industries where unions were weak, by furthering
equality in bargaining power. It certainly was not the purpose
of the Act to permit the weakening of a strong union by eviscerating judicial construction of the terms of a collective agreement contrary to the meaning under which the industry had
long been operating and for which the union is earnestly contending."6
Justice Frankfurter admonished the Court for its "doctrinaire" disregard of industrial realities that would inevitably spur
Congress to undo the Court's "heedless" decision, just as Congress
had overturned the Court's portal-to-portal decisions. : 7 These
words were indeed prophetic. Only one year later, Congress
amended the FLSA specifically to overrule the Bay Ridge holding."' Adopting Frankfurter's rationale, Congress again em95

334 U.S. at 483-84, 487.

9a6

Id.

97

Id. at 478.

9' Act of July 20, 1949, Pub. L. No. 81-177, 63 Stat. 446 (repealed 1949). This Act,
commonly referred to as the "Overtime on Overtime Bill," amended section 7(e) of the
FLSA by adding:
(e) For the purpose of computing overtime compensation payable under this
section to an employee-
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phasized the primacy of collective bargaining, denounced windfall
FLSA claims that usurped collective bargaining agreements, and
restated that it intended the FLSA to aid and not supplant the
principles of collective bargaining. So long as collective agreements were executed in good faith, they did not conflict with the
underlying purposes of the FLSA. 9

(2) who, in pursuance of an applicable employment contract or collective
bargaining agreement, is paid for work outside of the hours established in good
faith by the contract or agreement as the basic, normal or regular workday (not
exceeding 8 hours) or workweek (not exceeding 40 hours), at a premium rate
not less than one and one half times the rate established in good faith by the
contract or agreement for like work performed during such workday or workweek, the extra compensation provided by such premium rate shall not be
deemed part of the regular rate at which the employee is employed and may be
credited toward any premium compensation due him under this section for
overtime work.
Act of July 20, 1949, Pub. L. No. 81-177, 63 Stat. 446 (repealed 1949). See note 99 infra.
This provision is now codified at 29 U.S.C. § 207(e)(7) (1976).
99 In S. REP. No. 402, 81st Cong., 1st Sess. (1949), reprinted in [1949] U.S. CODE CONG.
& AD. NEws 1617, 1623-24 (emphasis added), the House Committee on Labor and Public
Welfare explained the rationale for the legislation retroactively overturning the Bay Ridge
holding:
1. The claims are in the nature of windfalls and in derogation of the collective
bargaining agreements as understood in the past by the contracting parties. The
longshore contract involved in the Bay Ridge case specifically stated that all
time not denominated straight time "shall be considered overtime and shall be
paid for at the overtime rate." Moreover, the denial of retroactive relief would, in
effect, penalize the large bulk of employees who have chosen to abide by the terms of the
collective agreement. The inequity of allowing such claims to prevail is further
aggravated by reason of the fact that the bulk of such claims arose from wartime exigencies which distorted normal work patterns.
2. The premium arrangements, understood by the contracting parties to
conform to the statutory overtime requirements, were the result of collective
bargaining. There is no evidence that the bargainingwas other than at arm's length. It
resulted in an arrangement which was highly advantageous to the employees
covered by the collective agreement. As the district court found in the Bay
Ridge case, there was 8-1/2 times as much contractual overtime as there was
overtime measured by the number of hours in excess of 40 worked for one
employer. Further, to the extent to which the arrangement was intended to and did
spread employment by encouragingthe concentration of work in straig7Tt-time hours, it is
consistent with one of the main purposes of the maximum hour provision of the Fair
Labor Standards Act.
3. The House and Senate reports on the FairLabor Standards Act strongly support
the view that the act was intended to aid and not supplant the efforts of American
workers to improve their position by self-organization and collective bargaining....
Although the Overtime on Overtime Bill was repealed by the Act of October 26, 1949,
Pub. L. No. 81-893, § 16(f), 63 Stat. 910 (current version at 29 U.S.C. § 207(e)(7) (1976), the
provisions overturning the Bay Ridge decision were retained "to solve the identical problems
Public Law 177 was intended to solve." CONF. REP. No. 1453, 81st Cong., Ist Sess. (1949),
reprinted in [1949] U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEws 2241, 2259-60.
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III
SECTION

301(a)

AND THE EMERGENCE OF GRIEVANCE

ARBITRATION AS THE PREEMINENT INDUSTRIAL
DISPUTE RESOLUTION MECHANISM

A. Collective Bargaining and the FLSA Before Taft-Hartley and Section
301(a)
Early Supreme Court decisions, FLSA legislative history, and
subsequent congressional reversal of errant Supreme Court interpretations demonstrate that Congress never intended the FLSA
to interfere with collectively bargained compensation arrangements even if such agreements varied from the literal requirements of the FLSA. On two occasions, Congress validated
arrangements fashioned through collective bargaining that the
Supreme Court had declared unlawful. Congress was not content
merely to eliminate the potential future liability posed by these
decisions. Instead, it amended the FLSA retroactively to validate
arrangements held unlawful under these decisions irrespective of
whether the arrangements were contained in a collective bargain100
ing agreement or in an individual employment contract.

100 Portal-to-Portal Act of 1947, Pub. L. No. 80-49 §§ 2, 3, 61 Stat. 86 (codified at 29

U.S.C. §§ 252, 253 (1976)) (providing retroactive relief from Tennessee Coal andJewell Ridge
Coal decisions); Act of October 26, 1949, Pub. L.*No. 81-393, § 16(e), 63 Stat. 920 (current
version at 29 U.S.C. § 207(e)(7) (1976)) (providing retroactive relief from impact of Bay
Ridge decision).
Some commentators argued that the 1949 amendments encroached on the flexibility
of labor and management in collective bargaining:
[T]he very detail to which the Congress has now gone in defining terms will
remove flexibility in labor-management practices or in collective bargaining.
This particular amendment certainly represents a long step away from the
viewpoint that the Act should deal only with basic minimum standards and not
seek to control wage practices which result in payments to employees far in
excess of any statutory minimum.
Smethurst & Haslam, The FairLabor Standards Amendments of 1949, 18 GEO. WASH. L. REv.
127, 153 (1950). See generally Soule, The FairLabor StandardsAmendments of 1949-Overtime
Compensation, 28 N.C.L. REV. 173 (1950); Note, The Fair Labor Standards Amendments of
1949, 34 MINN. L. REV. 670 (1950); Note, 1949 Amendments to the FairLabor Standards Act,
21 Miss. L.J. 265 (1950).
Smethurst's and Haslam's argument was implicitly recognized by the Supreme Court
in Addison v. Holly Hill Fruit Prods., 322 U.S. 607, 617 (1944), when it considered
whether certain employee classifications were exempt from FLSA coverage. It is undeniable, however, that the policies underlying Congress's repudiation of Bay Ridge and Jewell
Ridge Coal, as expressed in the Conference Reports, would not permit the subordination of
collective bargaining to the FLSA. Although the FLSA before Bay Ridge contained very
detailed provisions, Congress nevertheless required in 1949 that the FLSA yield when it
conflicted with a collective agreement. Furthermore, it is doubtful that Congress, after it

CORNELL LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 66:193

While limiting the government's ability to regulate wages and
hours under the FLSA, Congress was laying the groundwork for
the ascendancy of industrial self-government under the NLRA.
Following the enactment of the Taft-Hartley amendments to the
NLRA in 1947 (the Labor Management Relations Act),10 1 the
Supreme Court rendered a series of important decisions construing the amendments-particularly section 301(a)-that created
the statutory basis for private enforcement of labor contract
promises."0 2 Since 1948, the Court has not decided whether collective bargaining agreements varying from the literal requirements of the FLSA are permissible and thus, it has not considered
the impact of section 301(a) on this issue. The lower courts, however, have considered the FLSA/collective bargaining conflict in a
number of contexts.' 1 3 Although section 301(a)'s implications
have been considered in some cases, the results, charitably described, are irreconcilable. These cases have generally ignored the
historical development of the FLSA/collective bargaining relation,
and thus have misperceived the underlying purposes of the FLSA
and misapplied the policy underlying section 301(a). This section
analyzes federal labor law and labor policy as generally developed
under section 301(a), discussing two Supreme Court decisions that
considered, but did not decide, the FLSA/collective bargaining issue.
B. Protecting Collective Bargaining Rights Under Section 301(a)
The National Labor Relations Act of 1935 (the Wagner Act)
established-a national policy promoting the negotiation of collective bargaining agreements embodying both the terms and conditions of worker employment and the bargaining obligations of employers. 10 4 The Labor Management Relations
(Taft-Hartley) Act of 1947, which amended the Wagner Act, established statutory provisions for enforcing labor contract promises.'0 3 Taft-Hartley also established the Federal Mediation and
had expressed its preference for enforcing privately negotiated labor agreements in the
1947 Taft-Hartley amendments, would authorize a single rule of thumb-the FLSA's detail prevails over the generalized principles of free collective bargaining-when it enacted
the Portal-to-Portal Act.
101 Pub. L. No. 80-101, 61 Stat. 136 (codified in scattered sections of 29 U.S.C. (1976)).
102 See text accompanying note 109 infra.
103 See notes 150-236 and accompanying text infra.
104 See notes 12-22 and accompanying text supra.
105 The Taft-Hartley Act's declaration of purpose enunciated the objective of reducing
industrial strife through cordial contractual relations and peaceful dispute resolution. See
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Conciliation Service to assist parties involved in labor disputes to
settle their differences through mediation and conciliation. 10 6 The
Act declared that "the best interests of employers and employees can most satisfactorily be secured by the settlement of
issues between employers and employees throughi the processes of
conference and collective bargaining between employers and the
representatives of their employees,"'10 rather than by allowing government to establish the terms of employment for management
and labor. A corollary to the congressional policy of favoring the
settlement of issues through collective bargaining was Congress's
preference for resolving differences arising under collective bargaining agreements through contractual grievance procedures.
Section 203(d) of the Act declared that "[flinal adjustment by a
method agreed upon by the parties is ...the desirable method
for settlement of grievance disputes arising over the application or
interpretation of an existing collective-bargaining agreement." 108
Section 301(a) of the Act provides the statutory basis for enforcing collectively-bargained contracts and dispute-resolution
procedures:
Suits for violation of contracts between an employer and a labor
organization representing employees in an industry affecting
commerce ...may be brought in any district court of the
United States having jurisdiction of the parties, without respect
to the amount in controversy or without regard to the citizenship of the parties.'0 °:
Section 301(a) is not merely a jurisdictional or procedural statute;
the Court has interpreted Section 301(a) to authorize the federal
courts to fashion a substantive body of federal law for the enforcement of collective bargaining agreements.'
State courts
are not prevented, however, from exercising their traditional

Labor Management Relations (Taft-Hartley) Act of 1947, § 1, 29 U.S.C. § 141(b) (1976).
Cf. Teamsters v. Oliver, 358 U.S. 283, 294 (1959) (collective bargaining agreements are
"charters" for ordering of industrial relations). Section 7 of the NLRA, as amended by
Taft-Hartley, also guaranteed to employees the right to refrain from collective activity. See
note 9 supra.
106 Labor Management Relations (Taft-Hartley) Act of 1947, § 203(a), 29 U.S.C.
§ 173(a) (1976).
10' Labor Management Relations (Taft-Hartley) Act of 1947, § 201(a), 29 U.S.C.
§ 171(a) (1976). See generally 29 U.S.C. §§ 171(b)(c), 173(b)(c) (1976).
108 Labor Management Relations (Taft-Hartley) Act of 1947, § 203(d), 29 U.S.C.
§ 173(d) (1976).
,6,,
29 U.S.C. § 185(a) (1976).
110 See Textile Workers v. Lincoln Mills, 353 U.S. 448, 455-57 (1957).
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jurisdiction to enforce labor contracts. Employers, employees, and
unions may bring section 301(a) suits to enforce collective bargaining agreements in either state or federal court.1 11 Uniformity is
maintained because state courts are obligated to apply both the
federal rules of contract construction and federal substantive
12
labor law.'
Applying section 301(a)'s implicit command to fashion a body
of federal common law for labor relations, the Supreme Court has
held that a no-strike obligation should be implied into labor
agreements containing arbitration clauses." 3 This implicit nostrike obligation prohibits any strike over a dispute that is also
covered by the contractual grievance procedure. Section 301(a)
provides the mechanism for enforcing this obligation by allowing
courts to grant injunctive relief against strikes over arbitrable issues, i.e., strikes that breach the obligation to proceed under the
grievance-arbitration clause. 114 In the famous Steelworkers Trilogy,"-' the Court held that collectively bargained grievance resolution procedures must receive the broadest possible interpretation.
Although a party is not required to submit to arbitration disputes
that he has not agreed to arbitrate, "[dloubts should be resolved in favor of coverage." 116 Absent an express provision
excluding a particular grievance from arbitration, "only the most
forceful evidence of a purpose to exclude the claim from arbitration can prevail." 117 Courts deciding arbitrability questions cannot
weigh the merits of a particular grievance.' t 8 Courts can give
"full play" to the policy set forth in section 203(d) only by submitting all claims to arbitration. 1'1
Although individual employees are also permitted to enforce
collective bargaining agreements by a section 301(a) suit,1 20 the
11 Charles Dowd Box Co. v. Courtney, 368 U.S. 502 (1962).

Teamsters Local 174 v. Lucas Flour Co., 369 U.S. 95, 103-04 (1962); Smith v. Evening News Ass'n, 371 U.S. 195, 200-01 (1962).
"3
Gateway Coal Co. v. United Mine Workers, 414 U.S. 368, 382 (1974).
114 Id. at 381; Boys Markets, Inc. v. Retail Clerks Local 770, 398 U.S. 235 (1970). See also
Drake Bakeries v. Local 50, Bakery Workers, 370 U.S. 254, 264 (1962).
115 United Steelworkers v. American Mfg. Co., 363 U.S. 564 (1960); United Steelworkers v. Warrior & Gulf Navigation Co., 363 U.S. 574 (1960); United Steelworkers v. Enterprise Wheel & Car Corp., 363 U.S. 593 (1960).
16 United Steelworkers v. Warrior & Gulf Navigation Co., 363 U.S. 574, 583 (1960).
12

"7

Id. at 585.

United Steelworkers v. American Mfg. Co., 363 U.S. 564, 568 (1960).
Id. at 566. The arbitrator's award is enforceable unless it "manifests an infidelity to
the collective bargaining agreement." United Steelworkers v. Enterprise Wheel & Car
Corp., 363 U.S. 593, 597, 599 (1960).
20 Smith v. Evening News Ass'n, 371 U.S. 195, 199-200 (1962).
"s

".
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exclusivity, exhaustion, and finality principles circumscribe their
latitude to sue.'' These principles are designed to allow the
union and the employer to utilize fully their collectively bargained
grievance resolution procedures without judicial interference.'
Employees have no absolute right to force the employer and
union to arbitrate a grievance.' 23 Moreover, once a grievance has
been processed through the final step of the grievance procedure,
employees normally are barred by the arbitral finality rule from
litigating this grievance in court.' 2 4 The exclusivity, exhaustion,
and finality rules do not apply, however, when the union breaches
its duty of fair representation by either refusing to process a
grievance for arbitrary, bad faith, or discriminatory reasons, or
undermining the functioning of grievance procedures on grievances it has processed. 1 25 In such cases, the employee may sue

21 See notes 15-19 and accompanying text supra.
122 In Republic Steel Corp. v. Maddox, 379 U.S. 650 (1965), the Court held: "As a general rule in cases to which federal law applies, federal labor policy requires that individual
employees wishing to assert contract grievances must attempt use of the contract grievance
procedure agreed upon by employer and union as the mode of redress." Id. at 652 (emphasis in original).
The exclusivity principle allows the union to exercise considerable freedom when representing employees during contract negotiations. This freedom is circumscribed only by
the obligation to act in good faith required by the duty of fair representation. See notes
125-27 and accompanying text infra. The exhaustion principle requires the employee to
seek relief through the contractual grievance procedure before filing suit in court. Doubts
are resolved in favor of requiring resort to the grievance procedure. Failure to exhaust
contract remedies before suing in court generally requires dismissal of the claim. Republic
Steel, 379 U.S. at 657-59.
123 Vaca v. Sipes, 386 U.S. 171, 191 (1967).
24 Hines v. Anchor Motor Freight Inc., 424 U.S. 554, 571 (1976).
'2
Id. at 567-69: Vaca v. Sipes, 386 U.S. 171, 186 (1967). The Supreme Court first articulated the union's duty of fair representation in Steele v. Louisville & Nashville R.R., 323
U.S. 192 (1944), a case decided under the Railway Labor Act. This duty was specifically
extended to unions under the National Labor Relations Act in Wallace Corp. v. NLRB,
323 U.S. 248, 254-55 (1944). The duty is based upon the union's status as the exclusive
bargaining agent for all unit employees in labor relations matters involving the employer.
See 29 U.S.C. § 159(a) (1976). On the duty of fair representation generally, see Clark, The
Duty of Fair Representation: A Theoretical Structure, 51 TEXAS L. REV. 1119 (1973); Cox, The
Duty of FairRepresentation, 2 VILL. L. REV. 151 (1957); Cox, Rights Under A Labor Agreement,
69 HARV. L. REV. 601, 632-34 (1956); Feller, A General Theory of the Collective Bargaining
Agreement, 61 CALIF. L. REV. 663 (1973); Lewis, Fair Representation in Grievance Administration: Vaca v. Sipes, 1967 Sup. CT. REV. 81; Summers, Individual Rights in Collective Agreements and Arbitration, 37 N.Y.U.L. REV. 362 (1962); Summers, The Individual Employee's
Rights Under the Collective Agreement: What Constitutes FairRepresentation?, 126 U. PA. L. REV.
251, 257 (1977).
Legal scholars have argued, and the cases appear to recognize, that there is a legitimate distinction between fair representation in the contract negotiation context and in the
contract administration, i.e., grievance processing, context. The courts have applied a sub-
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directly in court even if he has failed to exhaust the grievance
procedure 12' or if an arbitrator has rendered an unfavorable rul27

ing.1

Section 301(a)'s pivotal role in the negotiation and administration of collective bargaining agreements cannot be ignored
when formulating the proper approach to the FLSA/collective
bargaining relation. Where a union-employer relation exists,
terms of employment affecting wages and hours are normally
embodied in a collectively-bargained labor agreement. Congress
has determined that disputes involving these agreements, which

jective standard, focusing on the union's good faith and honesty of purpose in the collective bargaining context, when measuring conduct against the duty. See Ford Motor Co. v.
Huffman, 345 U.S. 330, 337 (1953). These concepts must be interpreted to prohibit decisions made on proscribed grounds, such as race; thus, a sincere belief that racial discrimination is permissible would still violate the duty of fair representation. The Supreme Court
has further required the union to make a reasoned judgment on the merits of each particular claim when processing employee grievances. Vaca v. Sipes, 386 U.S. 171, 193-95
(1967). One commentator justified this dual approach as follows:
First, the aggrieved employee has an arguably vested interest in the specific
terms of a contract when grievance processing is involved. Second, the disposition of a grievance, especially one involving discipline or seniority, is of primary
importance only to the affected employee. Third, because grievance disposition
is of primary importance to the individual, the group interest is less important
in contract administration than in collective bargaining where the union requires flexibility in order to adjust the competing interests of various subgroups. Finally, the proviso in section 9(a) [which allows individual employees
to approach management with grievances] indicates a greater congressional
concern for the individual in grievance processing than in contract negotiations.
Leffler, PiercingThe Duty of FairRepresentation: The Dichotomy Between Negotiations and Grievance Handling, 1979 ILL. L.F. 35, 44. See also T. BoYcE, FAIR REPRESENTATION, THE NLRB,
AND THE COURTS 15-21, 29 (1978). These different approaches to the duty of fair representation do not reflect a judgment regarding the relative importance of contract negotiation
vis a vis grievance handling. In contract negotiation, it is not meaningful to apply an arbitrariness standard when the union pursues one political objective or concern at the expense
of others. It is likewise unmeaningful to consider a demand by one of the union's various
sub-groups as "arbitrary" or "unreasonable." Positions held by sub-groups are simply political facts that the union must recognize and accommodate. See Finkin, The Limits of Majority
Rule in Collective Bargaining, 64 MINN. L. REV. 183, 197, 206-10 (1980). Moreover, unreasonable or arbitrary conduct is more easily identified in grievance handling because
there are preexisting standards-contract terms-against which conduct may be measured.
"26 Vaca v. Sipes, 386 U.S. 171, 182-88 (1967). There is some dispute in the courts
whether the jurisdictional basis of fair representation suits is § 301(a) or § 9(a) of the
NLRA, 29 U.S.C. § 159(a) (1976) combined with 28 U.S.C. § 1337 (1976).
Although most fair representation suits are brought under § 301(a), those courts preferring § 9(a) and § 1337 as a jurisdictional basis point out that actions brought against the
union alone under § 301(a) are improper because the union has not executed a collective
bargaining agreement with its members. For an excellent discussion of this issue, see'T.
BoYcE, supra note 125, at 79-83.
217Hines v. Anchor Motor Freight Inc., 424 U.S. 554, 571-72 (1976).
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often contain internal dispute resolution procedures, 2 8 should be
settled by the parties pursuant to the policies and law developed
under section 301(a). Congress did not intend the FLSA, on the
other hand, to interfere with collective bargaining. Thus, wage
and hour issues arising under collective agreements should be resolved under section 301(a) through contract negotiation and
grievance procedures. Two Supreme Court decisions that indirectly affect this approach are discussed in the following subsection.
C. U.S. Bulk Carriers, Inc. v. Arguelles and Iowa Beef Packers,
Inc. v. Thompson
The Supreme Court examined the relation between the national policy favoring resort to contractual grievance procedures
and statutes granting independent rights in U.S. Bulk Carriers,Inc.
v. Arguelles. 12 1' In that case, a divided Court held that section
301(a) did not abrogate the right of a seaman to sue for unpaid
wages in federal court under a seaman's statute enacted in
1790.130 The Court interpreted section 301(a) as merely providing an optional remedy supplementing the ancient seaman's
statute and thus did not require exhaustion of the contractual
grievance procedure. Justice Douglas, writing for the majority,
characterized the Court's holding as "interstitial" legislation. 3 1
121

See note 42 supra.
U.S. 351 (1971). The U.S. Bulk Carriers case is discussed in Drieson, Arbitration

12!1 400

and Seaman's Rights Under Collective BargainingAgreements in the Wake of Arguelles, 3 J. MAR.
L. 429 (1972); Note, 59 B.U.L. REV. 157 (1971). See also Note, 18 WAYNE L. REV. 1465
(1972).
130 400 U.S. at 357. The seaman's statute, Act of July 20, 1790, § 6, 1 Stat. 133 (codified
at 46 U.S.C. § 596 (1976) provides:
The master or owner of any vessel making coasting voyages shall pay to
every seaman his wages within two days after the termination of the agreement
under which he was shipped, or at the time such seaman is discharged,
whichever first happens; and in case of vessels making foreign voyages, or from
a port on the Atlantic to a port on the Pacific, or vice versa, within twenty-four
hours after the cargo has been discharged, or within four days after the seaman
has been discharged, whichever first happens; and in all cases the seaman shall
be entitled to be paid at the time of his discharge on account of wages a sum
equal to one-third part of the balance due him. Every master or owner who
refuses or neglects to make payment in the manner hereinbefore mentioned
without sufficient cause shall pay to the seaman a sum equal to two days' pay
for each and every day during which payment is delayed beyond the respective
periods, which sum shall be recoverable as wages in any claim made before the
court....

46 U.S.C. § 596 (1976).
'31 400 U.S. at 354-58 (footnote omitted).
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He believed that section 301(a)'s silence on its relation to other
remedies did not demonstrate that Congress intended to abrogate
32
the seaman's ancient statutory remedy.1
In a separate concurring opinion, Justice Harlan disagreed
with the Court's characterization of contractual grievancearbitration procedures enforceable under section 301(a) as merely
an alternative avenue for enforcing the wage payment rights established by the seaman's statute. He explicitly recognized the
high priority of grievance-arbitration procedures in our national
labor policy 3 3-a preference also emphasized by the dissenting
Justices. 1 34 Justice Harlan joined the Court's opinion, however,
because the respondent seaman's claim to prompt payment of
wages rested not " 'simply on the contract' " but on the statutory
right created by the 1790 act.' 35 Thus, the grievance-arbitration
exhaustion requirement established under section 301(a) was inapplicable. Nevertheless, Justice Harlan urged the Court in future
cases to "fashion the relationships among forums according to an
analysis of the policies underpinning both [section] 301 and the
federal statute the employee invokes" before determining whether
the employee must exhaust the contractual grievance procedures
as a prerequisite to suit under another statute.1 3 6 Failure to make
this analysis, he warned, would undercut the national policy favoring arbitration: "[I]t may well be that certain types of federal
statutory benefits will lend themselves to arbitration or splitting
without an unacceptable sacrifice in competing policy interests." 137
132 Id. at 355-58. But cf. Sussa v. American Export Lines, Inc., 507 F.2d 1343 (2d Cir.
1974) (arbitration of wage claim bars subsequent action under seaman's statute).
133 Id. at 359.
134 Justices Brennan, Marshall and Stewart joined Justice White's dissenting opinion.
The dissenters emphasized that the labor agreement demonstrated the parties' intention to
resolve all disputes through the contractual grievance procedure. Id. at 373. The Court's
decision in Republic Steel Corp. v. Maddox, 379 U.S. 650 (1965), required employees to
exhaust the contractual grievance procedure before suing the employer. 400 U.S. at 37274. Republic Steel's exhaustion requirement recognized both the employer's interest in limiting the modes of redress and the union's interest in affording comprehensive protection to
employees and the arbitration process. Id. at 376-77. The dissenters specifically approved
several lower court decisions holding that employee claims for FLSA liquidated damages
should be deferred to contractual grievance procedures before the court exercises its jurisdiction. Id. at 375 (citing Beckley v. Teyssier, 332 F.2d 495 (9th Cir. 1964); Evans v. Hudson Coal Co., 165 F.2d 970 (3d Cir. 1948); Donahue v. Susquehanna Collieries Co., 138
F.2d 3 (3d Cir. 1943)). The dissent did not refer, however, tojewell Ridge Coal or Bay Ridge
and their subsequent congressional repudiation.
135 400 U.S. at 362.
131 Id. at 363.

137

Id. at 366.
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The Court addressed a similar issue involving an FLSA claim
in Iowa Beef Packers, Inc. v. Thompson.1 38 Several maintenance
employees brought an action in the Iowa state courts without first
attempting to exhaust contractual grievance procedures, claiming
overtime compensation for time they allegedly spent on call during their lunch periods. Affirming the trial court's judgment for
the employees, the Iowa Supreme Court held, in purported reliance on U.S. Bulk Carriers, that the FLSA's broad policy objectives allowed the workers to obtain compliance with the FLSA in
court without first exhausting the contract grievance procedure,
even though the dispute was "undoubtedly arbitrable." 13: In the
Iowa court's view, the employees could elect to pursue either remedy; the general congressional policy favoring arbitration
codified by the Taft-Hartley amendments must defer to antecedent FLSA provisions giving employees "strong and detailed
rights in court." 140
The Supreme Court granted certiorari to consider whether
employees may sue to recover overtime withheld in violation of
the FLSA even if the alleged statutory violation is also arbitrable
41
under a collectively bargained grievance-arbitration procedure.'
The Court later dismissed the writ of certiorari as improvidently
granted, however, because the scope of the contractual grievance
procedure was limited to violations of the agreement and thus did
not cover the alleged statutory violation.1 42 The Court specifi138 405 U.S. 228 (1972). A student author has concluded that FLSA rights are entirely
independent of the requirements of the Labor Management Relations Act. See Note, 18
WAYNE ST. L. REv. 1465, at 1476-78 (1972).
139 185 N.W.2d 738, 741-42 (Iowa 1971). The Iowa Supreme Court relied on the U.S.
Bulk Carriers decision, reasoning that the FLSA's "elaborate" provisions, including the
liquidated damages provision and the section authorizing the Secretary to supervise the
payment of unpaid overtime, demonstrated Congress's intent to preserve for employees an
independent right to bring FLSA court suits. Id.
140 Id. Two justices dissented in Iowa Beef. Relying on the national policy favoring arbitration, exclusivity of grievance procedures, decisions by federal courts requiring stays of
FLSA suits pending arbitration (see notes 80-86 and accompanying text infra), and the
concurring opinion of Justice Harlan in U.S. Bulk Carriers,they limited U.S. Bulk Carriers to
its peculiar facts and concluded that federal labor policy was best served by requiring
exhaustion of contractual grievance procedures before hearing an FLSA action. Id. at
742-46.
'4 See 405 U.S. at 229.
142 The Court's interpretation of the grievance procedure was too restrictive. Because

"[t]he grievance thus pertained not to an alleged violation of the agreement but to an
alleged violation of the [FLSA]," the grievance procedure was held inapplicable. Id. In the
same paragraph, however, the Court noted that the employees "did not choose, as perhaps
under the contract was open to them, to make the [issue] the basis of a grievance." Id. The
Court subsequently declined to rule on that question. See text accompanying note 143 infra.
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cally declined to decide whether "pursuit of the statutory remedy
is ...barred because [the employees] might have made the requirement to be on call the basis of a grievance for alleged violations of the lunch period or overtime provision of the collective-bargaining agreement."' 1 4 3 The Court misperceived the
issue. If the claim could have been the "basis of a grievance," then
the Court erred by dismissing the writ without addressing this
question because existing Court decisions absolutely require the
arbitration of grievances before suing in court. 1 44 Similarly, the
per curiam opinion neither attempted to reconcile its pos ition
with the rule that doubts about the scope of grievance-arbitration
procedures should be "resolved in favor of coverage," 145 nor referred to the Jewell Ridge Coal or Bay Ridge cases. The Court's
narrow holding, based upon the language of the contractual grievance procedure, may improperly imply that exhaustion of contract procedures is required only if the agreement specifically
requires processing FLSA disputes through the grievance procedure.
Except for the discredited Jewell Ridge Coal and Bay Ridge decisions, the Supreme Court has not squarely addressed either the
permissibility of negotiating labor agreements that vary from the
literal mandates of the FLSA or the prerequisites for establishing
that a collective labor agreement violates the FLSA. Although the
Court addressed an analogous issue in U.S. Bulk Carriers, it also
has not decided the issue left unresolved by Iowa Beef Packerswhether exhaustion of contractual grievance procedures not
explicitly applicable to FLSA disputes is a prerequisite to an FLSA
court suit. Failure to require exhaustion where labor agreements
contain more traditional grievance-arbitration procedures that do
not explicitly cover FLSA disputes would be anomalous in light of

The contract's arbitration clause covered a grievance " 'pertaining to a violation of the
Agreement.'" Id. at 230 (Douglas, J., dissenting). Certainly the claim that the employer
unilaterally eliminated coffee breaks and thus forced the employees to work more time
without increasing their compensation states a "violation" of the labor agreement.
143405 U.S. at 230-3 1. In his dissent, Justice Douglas, author of the majority opinion in
U.S. Bulk Carriers, argued that the Court should have considered whether the national
policy favoring arbitration must yield to accommodate independent actions for overtime
violations of the FLSA. In his view, U.S. Bulk Carriers controlled the issue and required
affirmance of the Iowa Supreme Court's decision. 405 U.S. at 231-32.
144 See notes 120-27 and accompanying text supra.
United Steelworkers v. Warrior & Gulf Navigation Co., 363 U.S. 574, 583 (1960).
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the federal labor policy developed by the Supreme Court under
section 301(a). 1 4 6 Unfortunately, the lower courts have also failed
to adequately address these issues.
IV
RECENT LOWER COURT DECISIONS: OPENING THE
COURTROOM DOOR IN NEEDLESS DEROGATION
OF COLLECTIVE BARGAINING

Although litigation involving FLSA/collective bargaining issues has steadily expanded, not a single lower court has issued a
comprehensive opinion acknowledging the purposes of the FLSA
and reconciling these purposes with the requirements of collective
bargaining. Their analyses have been piecemeal in nature, resulting in divergent rules of decision divorced from the fundamental
principles underlying the FLSA/NLRA relation. These cases encourage litigation, destabilize industrial relations, and hinder free
collective bargaining. This section analyzes the recent lower court
decisions, explaining their inconsistencies and concomitant adverse effects on collective bargaining.
A. Background of Current FLSA/NLRA Disputes
The FLSA/collective bargaining conflict usually involves a
dispute over overtime pay and, occasionally, time worked; the
disputes almost never involve sub-minimum wages. Some disputes
arise where the collective bargaining agreement does not contain a
contractual grievance procedure. When this occurs, courts must
directly decide whether the policies of the FLSA or the NLRA
should prevail. More commonly, however, the agreement contains
a grievance procedure that may or may not apply to FLSA issues,
making the issue more complicated.
Where the employee has initially sued in court, most courts
have held that the employee has a right of action independent of
the grievance-arbitration procedures. 14 7 The dicta in these cases
suggest that this right exists even if the dispute had been previously processed through a grievance procedure. However, in
every case to date, if the employee actually submitted his claim to
146 Id. Justice Douglas, however, stated in his Iowa Beef Packers' dissent that the usual
requirement of resort to contractual grievance procedures would not apply to FLSA suits.
405 U.S. at 232.
147 See notes 150-79 and accompanying text infra.
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arbitration, the courts have held that this submission foreclosed a
subsequent suit based on the FLSA. 148 Indeed, these cases
suggest that the FLSA claim must be submitted under the grievance procedure. If the Secretary of Labor, rather than the
employee, has filed the FLSA court suit, the only court that has
considered this issue held that the Secretary's suit was not foreclosed by a prior unfavorable arbitration decision. 1 49 Thus, the
reasoning of these cases, if not the results, is irreconcilable. A review of selected recent decisions-especially those that have
carved out independent FLSA rights of action-reveals that the
results are not guided by sound labor law considerations. They
rely instead on such improper assumptions as the presumed restrictiveness of contractual grievance procedures, the alleged unwaivability and independence of FLSA rights, and the assumed
applicability of cases decided under civil rights statutes.
B. Absent or Inapplicable Contractual Grievance Procedures
If the collective bargaining agreement contains no grievance
procedure, courts usually hold that employees retain an independent right under the FLSA to recover statutorily required wage
payments even though such payments either are not required by
the labor agreement or have been exchanged for other concessions during contract negotiations. For example, in Lerwill v. Inflight Motion Pictures, Inc.,' the employer and union entered into
a labor agreement containing an overtime pay provision. The
union subsequently agreed to waive enforcement of the overtime
provisions in return for a larger salary through an extended
workweek. Two employees brought a class action suit under section 301(a) to recover overtime pay as provided in the labor
agreement and allegedly required under the FLSA.' 5 '
The employer argued that the employees' potential cause of
action under the FLSA barred their suit under section 301(a).
The Ninth Circuit rejected this view 152 and held that the

148

1
1
152

See notes 192-224 and accompanying text infra.
See notes 225-236 and accompanying text infra.
582 F.2d 507 (9th Cir. 1978).
Id. at 510-11.
The court disposed of the employer's first contention that the employees were not

entitled to prosecute a section 301(a) action as individual union members by holding that
employees may enforce their personal rights directly in court under section 301. Id. at 511.
In addition, the court held that the employees were not required to exhaust grievance
procedures because the labor agreement did not contain specific grievance procedures. Id.
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employees could maintain their suit under either section 301(a) or
the FLSA. 153 The court also rejected the employer's defense that
the union had waived the contract's overtime provisions. Relying
on the discredited Tennessee Coal decision, the court held that a
union could not negotiate a labor agreement that violates the public policy set forth in the FLSA by waiving the overtime provisions
in exchange for a larger salary.1 5 4 Because of the alleged policy
requirements of the FLSA, employees were therefore allowed to
challenge the union's bargaining conduct through a section 301(a)
suit and to improve, at their option, the benefits achieved through
15 5
collective bargaining by suing under the FLSA.
Although the labor agreement in Lerwill did not contain a
grievance-arbitration procedure, other courts have held that such
procedures either are inapplicable to FLSA disputes or do not
foreclose an employee's right to bring an FLSA action. An example of this judicial misconstruction is the recent Ninth Circuit decision in Leyva v. Certified Grocers of California, Ltd. 15 6 Plaintiff
employees filed suit against their employer, alleging violations of
the collective bargaining agreement and FLSA overtime pay viola-

153

Id. at 513 (citing Leone v. Mobile Oil Corp., 523 F.2d 1153, 1157 (D.C. Cir. 1975),

and U.S. Bulk Carriers, Inc. v. Arguelles, 400 U.S. 351, 357-58 (1971)).
154 Id. at 513-14. To buttress its conclusion, the court cited United States v. Barnette,
546 F.2d 187 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 822 (1977), and Robertson v. Alaska Juneau
Gold Mining Co., 157 F.2d 876 (9th Cir. 1946), cert. denied, 331 U.S. 823, vacated and
remanded, 331 U.S. 793 (1947). Neither case supports the court's result. Barnette involved an
individual employment contract and Alaska Juneau was decided prior to the 1949 amendments overturning the Bay Ridge decision.
"5' This holding creates a disincentive for unions and employers to agree to wage or
hour provisions desired by a majority of unit employees whenever the agreement may also
violate an FLSA technical requirement. It is difficult to understand how this holding promotes national labor policy. See also Sturdivant v. Salt River Valley Water Users Ass'n,
249 F.2d 944 (9th Cir. 1957) (despite representation by strong union, time-worked formula
in collective bargaining agreement must follow FLSA scheme); Landaas v. Canister Co.,
188 F.2d 768 (3d Cir. 1951) (impermissible to eliminate attendance bonus from overtime
pay calculation despite agreement by union and company and no evidence of company
overreaching); Robertson v. Alaska Juneau Gold Mining Co., 157 F.2d 876 (9th Cir. 1946)
(FLSA's public policy requires employers to pay liquidated damages even though
employees, through union, forced unwilling employer to adopt illegal plan); Ciba-Geigy
Corp. v. Textile Workers Local 2548, 391 F. Supp. 287 (D.R.I. 1975) (dicta) (union cannot
agree to less than minimum wage); Merrill v. Exxon Corp., 387 F. Supp. 458 (S.D. Tex.
1974) (employer required to prove FLSA exemptions apply despite collective bargaining
agreement regulating compensation of employee-trainees); Castro v. Central Aguirre Sugar
Co., 208 F. Supp. 703 (D.P.R. 1962) (overtime and minimum wage action lies despite collective bargaining agreement regulating wage payments). But see Jackson v. Air Reduction
Co., 402 F.2d 521 (6th Cir. 1968) (inequitable for employees and union to compel change
in work schedule and then force company to pay FLSA penalty).
156 593 F.2d 857 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 827 (1979).
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tions, and against their union, alleging breach of the duty of fair
representation. t 5 7 The Ninth Circuit held that the trial court
properly stayed the contract claim pending arbitration,'. 8 but that
the FLSA claim could not be stayed pending arbitration because
the subject of this claim was not explicitly arbitrable under the
collective bargaining agreement.
Although the court was "cognizant of the strong [federal] policy favoring arbitration of labor disputes,"' -" it emphasized the
alleged "substantial differences" between the FLSA's substantive
and procedural mechanisms and those mechanisms provided in
the contract."" According to the Leyva court, these "substantial
differences" demonstrated that the parties did not intend to substitute contractual arbitration procedures for judicial enforcement
of statutory rights when the claims involved subjects covered by
the FLSA. t6 t The court reasoned that because the grievancearbitration procedures in the labor agreement were not identical
to the substantive and procedural provisions of FLSA, the
of
employer had no right to stay FLSA claims pending arbitration
62
agreement.
labor
a
under
issues
same
the
essentially
'5
Id. at 859. Plaintiffs sought unpaid overtime wages from their employer for a three
year period prior to filing of the suit, an equal amount of liquidated damages, and attorneys' fees under the FLSA. The district court granted the employer's motion to stay both
the FLSA and the contract claims until arbitration was completed pursuant to section 3 of
the United States Arbitration Act, 9 U.S.C. § 3 (1976). Id. at 859-60.
1"8 The employer argued that an addendum known as the Long Haul Agreement modified its labor agreement. Employees contended that the Long Haul Agreement was not a
proper modification of the labor agreement because they had not ratified it. Further, they
argued that the limited nature of the labor agreement's relief provisions permitted them to
sue directly in court without going to arbitration. The court held that the district court
properly stayed the contract action pending arbitration. Relying on United Steelworkers v.
Warrior & Gulf Navigation Co., 363 U.S. 574, 582-83 (1960), the court reasoned that the
employees were challenging only the validity of certain provisions of the contract, and not
the validity of the arbitration clause itself. 593 F.2d at 859-61.

159 Id.

at 861.

Id. at 862. The labor agreement limited compensation awards to a maximum of six
months. In contrast, the FLSA permits employees to recover wages and damages for a two
year period. The FLSA also provides for liquidated damages, costs, and attorneys' fees,
"protections not expressly provided by the collective bargaining agreement." Id.
16' Id. The court recognized that its interpretation of the arbitration provisions of the
contract conflicted with its interpretation of similar language in Beckley v. Teyssier, 332
F.2d 495 (9th Cir. 1964). Because of alleged differences between the scope of the grievance
procedures in Certified Grocers and Beckley, the court found it unnecessary to address the
substantive holding of Beckley that required a stay of judicial enforcement pending the
resolution of an arbitrable FLSA claim. 593 F.2d at 863. The Beckley case is discussed at
notes 181-86 and accompanying text infra.
'62 The court also found support for its holding in Iowa Beef Packers, U.S. Bulk Carriers
and Alexander v. Gardner-Denver Co., 415 U.S. 36 (1974). These decisions, the court
claimed, also emphasized the difference between statutory and contractual rights. But see
16'
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C. The Significance of Unutilized Grievance-ArbitrationProvisions That
Apply to FLSA Disputes
The courts have followed three different approaches where
contractual grievance procedures are available but not utilized to
resolve FLSA disputes. Several courts have held that the FLSA
claims may be brought directly in court without prior processing
under the grievance procedure. Other courts have stayed FLSA
claims pending arbitration under contractual grievance procedures. Finally, at least one court has held that prior resort to the
grievance procedure is mandatory.
1. PriorResort To Grievance-ArbitrationProcedures Not Required
Leone v. Mobil Oil Corp. 163 exemplifies cases holding that
FLSA suits are maintainable in court despite available contract
grievance procedures. The employees in Leone brought suit claiming that their employer violated the FLSA by failing to compensate them for time they spent accompanying OSHA inspectors on
a plant walkaround inspection.' 6 4 The employer argued that "the
suit [was] improper because the employees failed to exhaust the
grievance procedure specified in the collective bargaining agree-

notes 129-46 and accompanying text supra; notes 196-205 and accompanying text infra.
The court noted the conflict in the federal appellate courts regarding the relationship
between contractual grievance procedures and statutory actions brought under the FLSA.
593 F.2d at 863. Compare Evans v. Hudson Coal Co., 165 F.2d 970 (3d Cir. 1948) and
Watkins v. Hudson Coal Co., 151 F.2d 311 (3d Cir. 1945), cert. denied, 327 U.S. 777 (1946)
and Donahue v. Susquehanna Collieries Co., 138 F.2d 3 (3d Cir. 1943) (stay granted pending arbitration of FLSA claims) with Leone v. Mobil Oil Corp., 523 F.2d 1153 (D.C. Cir.
1975) (stay of FLSA claims pending arbitration refused). See also Bailey v. Karolyna Co., 50
F. Supp. 142, 144 (S.D.N.Y. 1943) (arbitration clause under collective bargaining agreement not related to plaintiff's claim under FLSA); City Bank Farmers Trust Co. v. O'Donnell, 179 Misc. 770, 771, 39 N.Y.S.2d 842, 843 (Sup. Ct. 1943) (not within scope of arbitration agreement); Garrity v. Bagold Corp., 180 Misc. 120, 121, 42 N.Y.S.2d 257, 258-59
(Sup. Ct. 1943) (dispute not within scope of arbitration clause); City Service Cleaning Contractors, Inc. v. Vanzo, 179 Misc. 368, 368, 39 N.Y.S.2d 24, 24 (Sup. Ct. 1942) (arbitration
rights are remedial whereas FLSA rights are substantive). Even though it held that the
employer was.not entitled to a stay under the Arbitration Act, the court held that a trial
court may properly stay an action to control its own docket. Therefore, the court remanded the case for consideration of whether the need for prompt payment of wages
outweighed the benefit of staying the proceedings pending arbitration of the wage claim.
593 F.2d at 863-64.
163 523 F.2d 1153 (D.C. Cir. 1975). For a very perceptive critique of Leone, see Note, 10
GA. L. REv. 843 (1976). The student author argues that FLSA disputes should be subject to
the exhaustion of contractual grievance procedures.
1" Under the Occupational Safety and Health Act of 1970, employees or their authorized representatives are permitted to accompany an OSHA inspector during a walkaround inspection of a workplace. 29 U.S.C. § 657(e) (1976).
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ment" before suing in court for compensable work time under the
FLSA. 115 The D.C. Circuit held that prior submission of the
employee's claim under the contractual grievance procedure was
not a mandatory prerequisite to a court suit based on the FLSA
claim.1"6 The court grounded its holding in part on the Iowa
Supreme Court's reasoning in Iowa Beef Packers that the FLSA
preserves for employees an optional remedy distinct from the
contract grievance procedure.1 6 7 The Leone court also relied on
Alexander v. Gardner-DenverCo. 1 68

In Gardner-Denver,an employee

brought a court suit under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of
1964, alleging that his employer had discriminatorily discharged
him. Although this claim had been previously processed through
the contractual grievance procedure and rejected by an impartial
arbitrator, the Supreme Court held that the "distinctly separate
nature" of contractual rights and rights under Title VII precluded waiver of Title VII rights through prior submission of adiscrimination claim to arbitration. 6 9 The Leone court reasoned
that 'Just as the right to be free from discrimination cannot be
waived by collective bargaining ... the principles of FLSA apply

despite contrary custom or agreement." 170 Finally, the court decried what it termed the "'heads-I-win, tails-you-lose' "171 implications of Mobil's argument: employees would be required to
exhaust contractual grievance procedures, but the union was not
required to process all grievances filed by employees, foreclosing
the employee from any relief.' 72 Thus, the court held that individual employees retain the option to select judicial determination
73
of wage claims under the FLSA.1

16.1523 F.2d at 1155.
166 Id. at 1155-58.
167 Id.

at 1157.
168 415 U.S. 36 (1974).
169 Id. at 50.

170523 F.2d at 1158. The court also argued that requiring the exhaustion of grievance
procedures would waste judicial time and prejudice the employee's statutory rights because
arbitrators may disagree on whether they can enforce unlawful contract provisions. Id. The
standards that arbitrators should utilize when statutory provisions overlap the contract are
discussed at note 251 infra.
171 523 F.2d at 1159.
172 523 F.2d at 1159. It is difficult to understand why the court found this surprising. It

is settled law that employees are required to exhaust contract grievance procedures even
though unions are not required to process all grievances filed by employees. See Republic
Steel Corp. v. Maddox, 379 U.S. 650, 652 (1965); notes 120-27 and accompanying text
.upra.
173 The court ruled, however, that neither the FLSA nor the Occupational Safety and
Health Act (OSHA) required compensation for employees who participate in an OSHA
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Iowa Beef Packers and Leone were also relied on by the Michigan Court of Appeals in Abbott v. Beatty Lumber Co. 174 Plaintiff
brought suit in state court alleging that his employer violated the
FLSA by failing to pay overtime compensation. Although the contract contained an overtime clause embodying the FLSA standard
and a grievance procedure, plaintiff did not submit his grievance
under the collective bargaining agreement.1 7 5 Noting with
apparent approval the 'judicial exception" terminating the right
of employees to sue for overtime compensation where a prior
submission to arbitration has been made,1 7 6 the court nevertheless
concluded that statutory entitlement to unpaid overtime compensation was unwaivable 17 7 and "wholly independent" of the provisions of any collective bargaining agreement.1 78 Thus, the court
held that plaintiffs were not required to exhaust contractual
79
grievance procedures before bringing an FLSA action.1

walkaround inspection. Moreover, this time was not "hours worked" under FLSA because
the employees voluntarily participated in the inspection. Id. at 1159-64.
174 90 Mich. App. 500, 282 N.W.2d 369 (1979).
17- Id. at 502-03, 282 N.W.2d at 370-71.
,76 Id. at 506, 282 N.W.2d at 372. The court did not attempt to reconcile its apparent
approval of this "judicial exception" with the remaining portions of its opinion holding that
FLSA rights were unwaivable.
'77 Id. at 507, 282 N.W.2d at 373. The court argued that the statute set out the exclusive
circumstances when FLSA rights could be waived or terminated. Id. at 504, 282 N.W.2d at
371. The FLSA's enforcement provisions are discussed at notes 31-37 and accompanying
text supra. Because no statutorily recognized waiver was made by either the employee or
the Secretary of Labor, the employees were not required to exhaust contractual grievance
procedures prior to instituting the court suit.
178 Id. at 504, 282 N.W.2d at 371. To support its holding that FLSA guarantees are not
superseded by collective bargaining agreements, the court mistakenly relied on Brooklyn
Savings Bank and two lower court decisions involving individual employee waiver questions.
The Brooklyn Savings Bank opinion expressly applies only to individual employment contracts and not to collective bargaining agreements. Indeed, Brooklyn Savings Bank stands for
the opposite proposition: that relative bargaining power is an appropriate consideration for
resolving FLSA issues. See notes 51-51 and accompanying text supra. The two lower court
decisions relied on in Abbott-Mumbowar v. Callicott, 526 F.2d 1183, 1188 (8th Cir. 1975),
and Marshall v. R & M Erectors, Inc., 429 F. Supp. 771, 780 (D. Del. 1977)-both apparently involved individual employment contracts. The effect of a collective bargaining
agreement is not discussed in either opinion.
,79 90 Mich. App. at 510, 282 N.W.2d at 374. For decisions in accord with the result in
Leone and Abbott, see Coleman v. jiffy June Farms, Inc., 458 F.2d 1139 (5th Cir.), cert.
denied, 409 U.S. 948 (1972) (union agreement to waive overtime pay violates duty of fair
representation; exhaustion doctrine suspended); Ballard v. Consolidated Steel Corp., 61 F.
Supp. 996, 997-98 (S.D. Cal. 1945) (agreement to arbitrate not conforming to statutory
rights under FLSA void). But see Papadopoulos v. Sheraton Park Hotel, 410 F. Supp. 217
(D.D.C. 1976) (action under District of Columbia wage statute not governed by Leone
choice of forum rule).
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2. Staying FLSA Suits Pending Arbitration
Although the employer did not ask for a stay of the judicial
proceedings pending submission of the dispute under the contract
grievance procedure, the Abbott Court noted that several courts
have stayed judicial proceedings in FLSA cases under either the
United States Arbitration Act or section 301(a). 180 The Ninth
Circuit stayed FLSA judicial proceedings pending grievance arbitration in Beckley v. Teyssier.1 81 The collective bargaining agreement in Beckley provided that the grievance procedure applied to
"[a]ll grievances or disputes ...arising out of the interpretation
or application of any of the terms or conditions of this Agreement." 182 The Beckley court's interpretation of the scope of the
grievance procedure differed from the interpretation by the court
in Leyva v. Certified Grocers of California, Ltd.: 183 the grievance procedure's coverage of FLSA claims was assumed rather than denied
by a fictitious assumption about the parties' intent to avoid coverage. Because the plaintiff employees' claims for overtime compensation under the FLSA grew "out of the relation of employer and
employee and necessarily involve[d] the application and interpretation of the contract provisions," the Beckley court held that the
judicial proceedings were properly stayed pending arbitration. 84

180 Id. at 509-10, 282 N.W.2d at 373-74. The Abbott court, however, noted that a stay

would not prevent an employee from filing an FLSA suit. Id., 282 N.W.2d at 373-74.
The United States Arbitration Act enforces contractual arbitration provisions contained in "any ... contract evidencing a transaction involving commerce." 9 U.S.C. § 2
(1976). The Act allows the federal courts to "stay the trial of [an] action until such arbitration has been had in accordance with the terms of the agreement." Id. at § 3. The availability of the Act in labor disputes has not been settled by the courts. See Note, supra note 138
at 1473-78. Section 1 of the Act specifically precludes application "to contracts of employment of seamen, railroad employees, or any other class of workers engaged in foreign or
interstate commerce." 29 U.S.C. § 1 (1976). The courts, however, have interpreted § 3
apart from § 1. See, e.g., Watkins v. Hudson Coal Co., 151 F.2d 311 (3d Cir. 1945), cert.
denied, 327 U.S. 777 (1946). Thus, when the claim before the court is based upon federal
subject matter jurisdiction arising under a statute other than the Arbitration Act (e.g.,
the
FLSA), the court may grant a stay under § 3 even though the court could not exercise
jurisdiction over the claim solely on the basis of the Arbitration Act. See, e.g., Beckley v.
Teyssier, 332 F.2d 495 (9th Cir. 1964). Section 3 injunctions have been obtained in FLSA
disputes when an individual employment contract providing dispute arbitration was involved. Donahue v. Susquehanna Collieries Co., 160 F.2d 661 (3d Cir. 1947). Injunctive
relief under § 3 has been denied, however, when the contract is a labor agreement covered
by the NLRA. See Metal Polishers Local 90 v. Rubin, 85 F. Supp. 363, 365 (E.D. Pa. 1949).
81 332 F.2d 495 (9th Cir. 1964).
182 Id. at 496.
183 593 F.2d 857 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 827 (1979).
184

332 F.2d at 497.
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The court refused to emasculate the contractual arbitration provision and it required arbitration of the FLSA claim in the first
instance. 8-5 The Leyva court, on the other hand, refused to uphold a stay of FLSA claims because its narrow and unrealistic interpretation of the grievance procedure excluded any potential
statutory dispute unless the relief sought was identical to that pro1 86
vided by contract.
3. Prior Resort to Grievance Procedures a Mandatory Prerequisite
for Judicial Action
In State ex rel Nilsen v. Berry,'8 7 the Oregon Supreme Court
reached a conclusion opposite that of the courts in Iowa Beef Packers, Leone, and Abbott on the significance of unutilized grievance
procedures. The state filed suit on behalf of several employees to
recover overtime pay allegedly due under Oregon's wage payment
law. t88 The court accepted the employer's affirmative defense,
holding that substantive federal labor policy, as developed under
section 301(a), superseded state wage payment laws18" and that
185 Id.; accord, Wren v. Sletten Constr. Co., 429 F. Supp. 982 (D. Mont. 1977). Other
courts adopted this approach even before section 301 was enacted. See, e.g., Evans v. Hudson Coal Co., 165 F.2d 970 (3d Cir. 1948) (stay required because issue was arbitrable;
arbitrator's province to correct statutory defects); Watkins v. Hudson Coal Co., 151 F.2d
311 (3d Cir. 1945) (employer entitled to stay of FLSA action pending arbitration even
though compensation arrangement facially unlawful); Donahue v. Susquehanna Collieries
Co., 138 F.2d 3 (3d Cir. 1943) (claim for unpaid overtime stems from employment relation; statutory remedies provided by FLSA not intended to choke arbitration). These cases
were cited with approval in Wilko v. Swan, 346 U.S. 427, 431-32 (1953), where the Supreme Court recognized that arbitration is a useful avenue for resolving controversies
based on statutes. But see Voutrey v. General Baking Co., 39 F. Supp. 974 (E.D. Pa. 1941)
(denying stay of FLSA action for overtime to permit arbitration under state statute). See
also Note, FairLabor StandardsAct-Arbitration of Employees' Suits, 13 FORnHAM L. REv. 109
(1944).
An issue left unresolved by the Beckley decision is the effect of an arbitrator's award in
subsequent FLSA court proceedings. See Abbott, 90 Mich. App. at 507-08, 282 N.W.2d at
372-73 (implying that arbitrator can only adjudicate contract and not statutory claim).
188 593 F.2d at 861-62. The contract provided:
Should any controversy, dispute or disagreement arise during the period of this
Agreement, out of the interpretation or application of the provisions of this
Agreement there shall be no form of economic activity by either party against
the other ... but the differences shall be adjusted [through grievance and arbitration].
Id. at 861 n.5 (quoting Wholesale Delivery Drivers Agreement, art. XVII).
117 248 Or. 391, 434 P.2d 471 (1967).
I88 The employees' assignment of this claim to the state was authorized by OR. REV.

STAT. § 652.330(2).
18" 248 Or. at 397-98, 434 P.2d at 474. The court relied on the Supreme Court's decision in Textile Workers v. Lincoln Mills, 353 U.S. 448, 455 (1957), which emphasized the
federal policy to enforce labor agreements.
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the employees must seek relief through the grievance procedures
provided in the collective bargaining agreement. 9 0 The court
also rejected the state's contention that employees possess an independent right to sue in court under the FLSA. Federal labor
policy required arbitration of the employees' FLSA claims, the
court held, even if the arbitration agreement conflicted with the
FLSA.1 J1
D. The Impact of PriorResort to Grievance-Arbitrationon FLSA Rights
Beginning with the Tenth Circuit's important decision in Satterwhite v. United Parcel Service, Inc.,' 9 2 a separate line of decisions
has held that submission of a claim to arbitration under a collectively bargained grievance procedure forecloses the right of an
employee to sue his employer under the FLSA. Although factually
distinguishable from the Iowa Beef Packers-Leone line of cases, the
underlying policy considerations affecting these decisions are substantially the same, and thus, the results are irreconcilable.
In Satterwhite, employees sued their employer under the
FLSA to recover overtime pay attributable to the employer's unilateral elimination of two paid-time coffee breaks. Prior to the
FLSA suit, the union representing these employees and the
employer arbitrated the dispute under the labor agreement's
grievance procedure. The arbitrator, determining the validity of
the employer's conduct under the labor agreement, held that the
employer could not unilaterally eliminate the paid coffee breaks
and that the employees were entitled to thirty minutes pay at
straight time rates for each day worked during the pertinent
period.' 1 3 The employees sued under the FLSA to recover overtime pay at time and one-half for the coffee break periods.' 9 4
Thus, the issue before the Satterwhite court was whether an arbi-

248 Or. at 396, 434 P.2d at 474.
Id. at 398, 434 P.2d at 475. The court did not discuss whether, after submitting the
claim to arbitration, the employees could challenge the arbitrator's decision on the ground
that it violated the FLSA.
1.92496 F.2d 448 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 1079 (1974).
190
""

"93

Id. at 449.

'9' The district court dismissed the employees' suit, relying on the Tenth Circuit's decision in Alexander v. Gardner-Denver Co., 466 F.2d 1209 (1972), rev'd, 415 U.S. 36 (1974).
The Tenth Circuit had held that an employee's prior submission of a discrimination claim
to arbitration barred a subsequent suit under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964.
During the pendency of the employees' appeal in Satterwhite, the Supreme Court reversed
the Tenth Circuit's decision in Gardner-Denver.See notes 196-98 and accompanying text
infra.
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trator's award precluded the employees' statutory claim under the
FLSA. The court held that the employees were barred from relitigating their FLSA claims after they had been submitted by
their union to arbitration. t ' 5
The court first distinguished the Supreme Court's holding in
Gardner-Denver that an arbitrator's resolution of a contractual
claim does not bar a statutory claim on the same facts under Title
VII."'
The Gardner-Denver decision held that Title VII
supplemented existing procedures to combat employment discrimination. Title VII rights were unwaivable, however, because
they formed no part of the bargaining process.' 9 7 The Court refused to defer to the arbitrator's Title VII award because that
would usurp the federal courts' ultimate responsibility for enforct8
ing Title VII. 9
The Satterwhite court argued that Title VII and the FLSA
differed significantly.""' The Tenth Circuit recognized that Congress directly addressed the relation between the Wage-Hour law
and collective bargaining in the FLSA's legislative history. The
Portal-to-Portal Act's preamble rejected judicial interpretations in
derogation of collective bargaining and declared that the congressional policy was "to protect the right of collective bargaining and
... to define and limit the jurisdiction of the courts."20 0
In contrast, the Supreme Court stated in Gardner-Denver that "Title VII
does not speak expressly to the relationship between federal
courts and the grievance-arbitration machinery of collectivebargaining agreements."2 0 t The Satterwhite court also noted that
'

496 F.2d at 452.

"'s 415 U.S. 36, 46 n.6 (1974).

197 Id. at 47-49. The Court also rejected application of the doctrine of election of. remedies because Title VII rights were distinctly separable from contract rights. Id. at 49-51.
",s Id. at 45. See also Newman v. Piggie Park Enterprises, Inc., 390 U.S. 400, 402 (1968).
Ii
The court first noted that the Gardner-Denver decision referred to the significant
role played by private individuals in enforcing Title VII rights. See 415 U.S. at 48. In
contrast, the Satterwhite court believed that private enforcement of FLSA rights was not the
paramount enforcement mechanism. 496 F.2d at 450; see Employees Etc. v. Department of
Public Health and Welfare, 411 U.S. 279, 286 (1973). Independent remedies under Title
VII demonstrated a congressional intent to provide an alternative avenue of relief to supplement labor agreements; however, the absence of such procedures under the FLSA
"suggest[ed] a greater reliance on contract remedies and a lesser emphasis on individual
enforcement." 496 F.2d at 450. The argument that the FLSA does not provide for individual enforcement is tenuous. The Tenth Circuit's other attempts, however, to distinguish
Title VII and FLSA rights, and their relationship to collective bargaining, are unassailable.
200 496 F.2d at 451 (quoting 2 U.S.C. § 251(b) (1976)); see note 93 supra.
201

415 U.S. at 47.

242
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in certain circumstances good faith was a defense to an FLSA action but not to a Title VII suit. 20 2

The court recognized the most

significant difference between Title VII and the FLSA-Congress
did not intend the same treatment for wage disputes and racial
disputes:
Wages and hours are at the heart of the collective bargaining process. They are more akin to collective rights than to individual rights, and are more suitable to the arbitral process
than Title VII rights. ...

"The specialized competence of arbi-

trators pertains primarily to the law of the shop, not the law of
the land ...Ijiudicial construction has proven especially necessary with respect to Title VII, whose broad language frequently
can be given meaning only by reference to public law concepts."
We are concerned with rate of pay, an issue which does not
require, or lend itself to, public law considerations. The added
fear expressed in Gardner-Denver that harmony between a
union and an individual cannot be presumed "where a claim of
racial discrimination is made," ... has no pertinence here. One

of the highest objectives of any union is to get all the money
20 3
possible for all of its members.

Other considerations not specifically discussed in Satterwhite,
but addressed by the Supreme Court in its Gardner-Denver decision, also demonstrate that collective wage issues under the FLSA
are distinguishable from claims under the civil rights statutes. In
Gardner-Denver, the Court noted that a "union may waive ...
statutory rights related to collective activity, such as the right to
strike.

'

20

4

The union cannot, however, waive individual rights

conferred by Congress prohibiting discrimination because such
rights are not rooted in the collective bargaining process .205
Furthermore, Title VII's legislative history-unlike the
FLSA's -"manifests a congressional intent to allow an individual
to pursue independently his rights under both Title VII and

202 496 F.2d at 450-51. Compare 29 U.S.C. § 259(a) (good faith defense in FLSA suit)
with Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424, 432 (1971) (good faith invalid defense in
Title VII actions).
203 496 F.2d at 451. The court recognized that emphasizing collective bargaining and
the enforcement of collectively bargained labor agreements promoted the national interest
in preserving industrial peace. Id. Ironically, the court cited Brooklyn Savings Bank, 324 U.S.
697 (1945), for the proposition that FLSA rights could not be waived by agreement. 496
F.2d at 451. It did not, however, discuss the relative bargaining power distinction drawn by
the Supreme Court in Brooklyn Savings Bank. See notes 51-57 and accompanying text infra.
204 415 U.S. at 51.
205 Id.
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other applicable state and federal statutes."2 0 6 The Title VII/
FLSA analysis is far more complex than simply noting that one
Id. at 48 (footnote omitted); see Oubichon v. North Am. Rockwell Corp., 482 F.2d
596, 573 (9th Cir. 1973) (Congress enacted Title VII in part because grievance-arbitration
machinery proved inadequate to protect employees from racial discrimination); 110 CoNG.
REc. 7205, 13,650-51 (1964); H.R. REP. No. 9247, 92d Cong., 1st Sess. (1971); H.R. REP.
No. 238, 92d Cong., Ist Sess. 3 (1971).
The relationship between collective bargaining and suits brought under other antidiscrimination statutes should be analyzed similarly to Title VII actions. See, e.g., Corning
Glass Works v. Brennan, 417 U.S. 188 (1974) (action brought under FLSA's equal pay
provisions challenging collective bargaining agreement's outmoded assumption that males
should be paid more than females for same work); EEOC v. American Tel. & Tel. Co., 556
F.2d 167 (3d Cir. 1977) (judicially decreed affirmative action plan may override collective
bargaining agreement under Equal Pay Act and Title VII), cert. denied, 438 U.S. 915
(1978); Phillips v. Carborundum Co., 361 F. Supp. 1016 (W.D.N.Y. 1973) (exhaustion of
grievance-arbitration procedures not required before prosecuting Equal Pay Act claim).
Unfettered negotiation of employment conditions in labor agreements is arguably restricted by any statute-regardless of whether it is anti-discriminatory-that touches upon
the employment relation, such as Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, the child labor
provisions of the FLSA, the Occupational Safety and Health Act of 1970 (OSHA), the
Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974 (ERISA), and even the National Labor
Relations Act. The short answer is that the wage and hour provisions of the FLSA were
intended to be treated differently from these other statutes. The negotiation of wages and
hours forms the heart of the bargaining process. Wages and hours are also subjects that
unions typically and competently address not only in contract negotiations but also in contract administration. Title VII considerations, on the other hand, are not entitled to this
presumption of union competency.
Any perceived conflicts between collectively negotiated arrangements and the NLRA
cannot stand as barriers to the establishment of terms and conditions best suited to the
needs of management and labor where the FLSA is involved. The NLRA is a congressional
judgment that seeks to facilitate employee choice by imposing certain rules that prohibit
interference with employee choice. Because collective bargaining arises out of employee
choice, unions cannot negotiate in the employees' best interests when employee choice has
been undermined. Emporium Capwell Co. v. Western Addition Community Org., 420
U.S. 50, 65 n.14 (1975); NLRB v. Magnavox Co., 415 U.S. 322 (1974). NLRA principles
that override collectively bargained arrangements are thus best viewed as insuring that the
needs of the parties are truly expressed.
Furthermore, the NLRA, unlike the FLSA, contains an explicit provision authorizing
the National Labor Relations Board to enforce the NLRA irrespective of any private dispute resolution mechanism. See 29 U.S.C. § 160(a) (1976). Even though the NLRB has the
power to intervene where statutory rights are at issue, it typically refrains under the Collyer
and Spielberg doctrines of deferral. See Collyer Insulated Wire, 192 N.L.R.B. 837, 71
L.R.R.M. 1931 (1971) (NLRB deference proper in § 8(a)(5) case pending submission of
contract dispute to arbitration, but jurisdiction retained); Spielberg Mfg. Co., 112 N.L.R.B.
1080, 36 L.R.R.M. 1152 (1955) (NLRB deference to arbitrator's award acceptable if proceedings are fair and regular, parties agree to abide by decision, and decision is not clearly
repugnant to NLRA). See generally Carey v. Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 375 U.S. 261 (1964)
(grievance procedures further policies of NLRA; unfair labor practice rulings take precedence over arbitral decision). But see NLRB v. C & C Plywood Corp., 385 U.S. 421, 427
(1967) (NLRB does not have general jurisdiction over all alleged violations of collective
bargaining agreement).
Although less obvious, questions arising under the Occupational Safety and Health
Act of 1970, 29 U.S.C. §§ 651-678 (1976), should be analyzed in the same way as those
206
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right arises by contract and the other by statute. Both the congressional purposes and the right's collective or individual nature
should be considered. Although it correctly analyzed the collective
nature of the FLSA right in issue, the Satterwhite court significantly understated congressional assessment of the relationship between the FLSA and collective bargaining. As previously discussed, this assessment reveals that the Satterwhite court was more
correct than it perhaps realized.
The Satterwhite holding was subsequently applied in Atterburg
v. Anchor Motor Freight, Inc. ,207 and in the Eighth Circuit's recent
decision, Barrentine v. Arkansas-Best Freight System, Inc. 0 8 Plaintiff
employees in Atterburg sued their employer under the FLSA for
minimum wages and overtime compensation. Some of the

arising under civil rights statutes. Congress intended OSHA to protect individual
employees from job-related injuries and to obviate the catastrophic wage loss that often
accompanies industrial injuries. See Brennan v. Southern Contractors Serv., 492 F.2d 498,
501 (5th Cir. 1974); S. REP. No. 1282, 91st Cong., 2d Sess., reprinted in [1970] U.S. CODE
CONG. & AD. NEWS 5177; SENATE SUBCOMM. ON LABOR, LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF THE OCCUPATIONAL SAFETY AND HEALTH ACT OF 1970 142, 166, 297 (1971). Individual concerns
are the focus in OSHA matters, and group, i.e., union assistance is statutorily encouraged
to achieve OSHA's objectives. The statute specifically authorizes employee representatives
to assist OSHA officials who inspect workplaces, 29 U.S.C. § 657(c) (1976), allows unions to
request inspections, id. § 657(f), and authorizes employee representatives to participate in
administrative hearings concerning employer citations, id. § 659(c). Thus, OSHA complaint
procedures supplement contractual remedies by procuring union assistance to effectuate
the Act's objectives.
Nevertheless, OSHA procedures yield to contractual grievance-arbitration in one instance. If an employee who has been discharged for exercising his rights under the Act
challenges the discharge under the collective bargaining agreement's grievance-arbitration
procedures, the OSHA regulations provide, out of deference to the national policy favoring resolution of disputes under labor agreements, that the Secretary of Labor may defer
to the arbitrator's decision in lieu of bringing his own court action under section 1 1(c), id.
§ 660(c). See 29 C.F.R. § 1977.18 (1979). One court has held, however, that an unfavorable
arbitration award does not bar judicial relief by the Secretary of Labor under section 11(c).
Marshall v. N.L. Indus. Inc., 618 F.2d 1220, 1122-23 (7th Cir. 1980) (OSHA rights extend
beyond labor agreement; Gardner-Denver controls). See also Phillips v. Interior Bd. of Mine
Operations Appeals, 500 F.2d 772 (D.C. Cir. 1974) (arbitration of issues under Mine Safety
Act controlled by Gardner-Denver), cert. denied, 420 U.S. 938 (1975).
When analyzing the impact of statutes on collectively negotiated compensation arrangements, courts should consider the congressional purpose, the union's competency to
effectuate statutory goals, and the individual or collective nature of the right involved. This
question cannot be answered by simply saying that one right is statutory, the other contractual, and thus the statutory right controls. The correct result is discerned only by reconciling the multi-faceted objectives of each statute involved with the requirements of free collective bargaining.
207 425 F. Supp. 841 (D.NJ. 1977).
208 615 F.2d 1194 (8th Cir.), cert. granted, 49 U.S.L.W. 3245 (U.S. Oct. 6, 1980) (No.
79-2006).
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employees' claims had been previously processed through the
grievance procedure, but the majority of claims had not. One of
the issues before the district court was whether prior submission
of these claims to arbitration under the contractual grievance procedure barred a subsequent independent suit in federal court
under the FLSA.20
Adopting the Satterwhite holding, the district
court held that the FLSA claims were barred. 210 Moreover, the
court reasoned that plaintiffs' failure to protest submission of
their wage claims to arbitration demonstrated their consent to
abide by the arbitrator's final determination even though the
claims were apparently not arbitrable under the collective bargain211
ing agreement.
In Arkansas-Best Freight, plaintiff employees brought an action
against their employer claiming wages for time spent making pretrip safety inspections and transporting trucks to repair facilities,
and against their union for breach of its duty of fair representation. 2 12 The agreement provided that disputes that reach the
final step in the grievance procedure were to be decided by a joint
employer-union grievance committee.21 3 After the grievance
209 425 F. Supp. at 842-43.

Id. at 845.
Id. at 844. See Amicizia Societa Navegazione v. Chilean Nitrate and Iodine Sales
Corp., 274 F.2d 805, 809 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 363 U.S. 843 (1960); Island Creek Coal
Sales Co. v. Indiana-Kentucky Elec. Corp., 366 F. Supp. 350, 353 (S.D.N.Y. 1973), aff'd
mem., 498 F.2d 1396 (2d Cir. 1974).
The court also discussed the employees' assertion that the union breached its duty of
fair representation by arbitrarily processing their claims. Because they failed to produce
any evidence to substantiate this assertion, the court dismissed the duty of fair representation count. 425 F. Supp. at 846-47.
212 An employee normally punched in when reporting to work and was paid at lower
rates for time spent on preliminary office duties. After completing that work, the employee
"'punched out" and walked to his truck, where he made a mandatory pre-trip safety inspection. If the truck was in working order, the driver would begin his trip, earning pay at
driving rates for all driving time. This practice was not challenged. If the preliminary
safety inspection uncovered defects, the driver was required to take the equipment to the
company's repair facility. At the repair facility, the driver would punch in again. After the
equipment was repaired, the driver would punch out a second time and begin his road
trip. The issue before the court concerned the company's failure to pay the drivers for the
time spent between the first punch out and the second punch in. 615 F.2d at 1197.
212 Id. at 1197. The court noted, but did not accept, the employees' argument that
because the joint employer union grievance committee was susceptible to abuse and collusive secret agreements, individual employee interests may be sacrificed by arrangements
that management and the union consider consistent with their own broader interests. Id. at
1201.
This method of grievance resolution has been both criticized and approved. See General Drivers Union Local 554 v. Young & Hay Transp. Co., 522 F.2d 562, 567 n.5 (8th Cir.
1975); Azoff, Joint Committees as an Alternative Form of Arbitration Under the NLRA, 47 TuL.
L. REv. 325 (1973); Feller, A General Theory of the Collective BargainingAgreement, 61 CALIF.
210
211
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committee denied the employees' wage claims, the employees filed
2 14
suit.
In affirming the district court's order dismissing the complaint, the Eighth Circuit rejected plaintiffs' analogies to the
Gardner-Denver decision, adopting the Satterwhite distinction between wage disputes and cases involving racial discrimination.2 1 5
The court also relied on section 203(d) of the Labor Management
Relations Act, which declares that "[f]inal adjustment by a method
agreed upon by the parties is declared to be the desirable method
for settlements of grievance disputes. 21 6
Thus, where
"employees knowingly and voluntarily submit their grievances
to
21 7
arbitration," a subsequent FLSA suit is barred.
The Arkansas-Best court recognized the difficulty of reconciling its holding with the decisions in Iowa Beef Packers and Leone.
Four of the six plaintiffs in Arkansas-Best had not filed grievances.

L. REV. 663, 836-38 (1973); See generally Hines v. Anchor Motor Freight, Inc. 424 U.S. 554
(1976); Humphrey v. Moore 375 U.S. 335 (1964); General Drivers Local 89 v. Riss & Co.
372 U.S. 517 (1963).
214 The Portal-to-Portal claim was premised on the theory that the time spent
by the
employees between the first punch out and the second punch in was compensable time.
Section 4(b) of the Portal Act provides:
(b) Notwithstanding the provisions of subsection (a) of this section which
relieve an employer from liability and punishment with respect to an activity,
the employer shall not be so relieved if such activity is compensable by either(1) an express provision of a written or nonwritten contract in effect, at
the time of such activity, between such employee, his agent, or collectivebargaining representative and his employer; or
(2) a custom or practice in effect, at the time of such activity, at the establishment or other place where such employee is employed, covering such activity, not inconsistent with a written or nonwritten contract, in effect at the time
of such activity, between such employee, his agent, or collective-bargaining representative and his employer.
29 U.S.C. § 254 (b) (1976).
The employees also alleged that their union breached its duty of fair representation.
The district court held that even though the employees' claim for compensable time might
be valid under the contract, collective bargaining agreements are in certain respects sui
generis because provisions relating to compensable working time cannot always be construed
literally, particularly where the union has tolerated a variance from the contract language
in the past. Thus, the court found that the union did not breach its duty of fair representation. 615 F.2d at 1198-99, 1202.
215 Id. at 1200. In his dissenting opinion, Judge Heaney argued that the FLSA claim was
not precluded by prior submission to arbitration unless the parties clearly and unequivocally authorized the arbitrator to decide the FLSA issue. Id. at 1203.
216 29 U.S.C. § 173(d) (1976).
217 615 F.2d at 1199; accord, Melanson v. John J. Duane Co., [1980] LAB. REL. REP. (24
Wage and Hour Cas.) 994 (D.Mass. Sept. 4, 1980); cf. Union de Tronquistas de Puerto
Rico Local 901 v. Flagship Hotel Corp., 554 F.2d 8 (1st Cir. 1977) (claim under Puerto
Rico's wage regulations barred by prior arbitration; Satterwhite applied).
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The district court held that these four claims were not barred for
failure to exhaust the contract grievance procedure; the court
noted that filing a grievance would have been "futile" because the
joint labor-management committee previously rejected the grievances filed by the other plaintiffs based on the same facts.2 18 The
district court decided, however, to treat the four plaintiffs " 'as
though each of the[m] had actually filed grievances which were
considered and denied.' "2"" This result is significant because it
eliminates an important factual distinction-whether the claims
were actually submitted under the grievance procedure-and
thereby preserves the conclusiveness of negotiated remedies and
extends the contractual preclusion of independent FLSA actions
beyond situations in which a grievance is actually pursued
through the grievance procedure.22 0
It was unnecessary, however, for the Eighth Circuit to adopt
full), the trial court's reasoning. The employees' independent ability to pursue FLSA actions in court should not depend on
whether they "voluntarily" submitted their wage claims under
available grievance procedures. As the Supreme Court recognized
in Gardner-Denver, the "actual submission" of a claim to
grievance-arbitration does not alter the character of the right involved. 221 Because FLSA wage claims are inherently collective in
nature and our labor policy requires resort to contractual grievance procedures before suing in court, employees should be required in every case to submit their wage complaints to available
contractual grievance procedures before a court can adjudicate an
FLSA suit. Courts should treat the "voluntariness" of grievance
submission in an FLSA dispute no differently from any other
grievance arising under the contract. 22 2 It was unnecessary for
the Arkansas-Best court either to characterize the FLSA claims of
the plaintiffs who did not file grievances "as though ... [they] had

218
219

Id. at 1200-01.
Id. at 1201.

220 Id.

at 1201.

221 415 U.S. at 52.
222 The right to sue or arbitrate should not depend on judicial determination of whether
the employee recited magic words of consent. The test of whether submission is required
should be determined solely by the standard announced in United Steelworkers v. Warrior
& Gulf Navigation Co., 363 U.S. 574, 583 (1960): all "[d]oubts should be resolved in favor
of coverage."
One court has applied this doctrine to hold that once otherwise non-arbitrable FLSA
matters are submitted to arbitration, the employees are barred from pursuing an FLSA suit
in court. Atterburg v. Anchor Motor Freight, 425 F. Supp. 841 (D.N.J. 1977).
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actually filed grievances," or to consider such a filing "futile." 22 3
The plaintiffs failed to file grievances over their FLSA claims and
thus they were barred by the grievance exhaustion rule from
22 4
suing in court.
E. Suits by the Secretary of Labor And PriorArbitral Determinations
In Marshall v. Coach House Restaurant, Inc., 22 5 the district
court considered whether the Secretary of Labor was precluded
from seeking injunctive relief and suing for overtime payments by
a prior and binding arbitration between the employer and
employees' union. Before the overtime grievance had been submitted to arbitration, the Department of Labor's Wage and Hour
Division conducted a routine investigation of the employer to
check for compliance with the FLSA, and found several alleged
overtime and recordkeeping violations.2 26 After the investigation,
but before the Secretary filed suit, an arbitrator issued an award
holding that the employer made proper overtime payments under
the terms of the collective bargaining agreement and under the
FLSA.2 27
The district court rejected the Leone argument that GardnerDenver preserved the employees' option to bring independent
FLSA suits, particularly when the claim had been previously submitted to arbitration. 22 8 Instead, the court accepted the Satterwhite analysis-that the national policy favoring arbitration assumes greater significance in FLSA than in Title VII disputes.2 2 9
The court held, however, albeit most "reluctantly," that because
the Secretary of Labor had not participated in the arbitration, the
public interest protected by FLSA injunctive actions prevented the
court from giving binding effect
to prior arbitral awards when the
23 0
Secretary initiated the suit.
223 615 F.2d at 1200-01.
224

Republic Steel Corp. v. Maddox, 379 U.S. 650, 652-53 (1965).

22 457 F. Supp. 946 (S.D.N.Y. 1978).
226 Id. at 948.
227 Id. at 949.

228 Id. at 950-51. See notes 163-73 and accompanying text supra.
221 457 F. Supp. at 950-51.
20 Id. at 952. The court skirted the question of whether the Secretary's claim under

section 16(c) of the FLSA, 29 U.S.C. § 216(c) (1976), which sought unpaid overtime on
behalf of the employees, was barred by the arbitration award. Instead, the court emphasized that the policy behind the Secretary's section 17 action, 29 U.S.C. § 217 (1976),
was to restrain improper wage payments. These injunctive suits, the court argued, promoted the public interest by depriving a violator of unlawfully withheld compensation and
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The court recognized that its decision was "at odds with the
strong federal policy favoring the resolution of labor disputes
through collective bargaining and its concomitant-binding arbitration."2 31 Indeed, the court noted that prior submission to arbitration was entirely proper and that the arbitrator possessed the
"institutional competence" to decide FLSA wage claims.23 2 The
court's holding, however, created a no-win proposition for
employers: "[i]f the employee wins in arbitration his employer is
bound, but if the employer wins, his victory is illusory because the
Secretary may seek de novo review in the courts." 233 The court
invited the Department of Labor to resolve this conflict by participating in the arbitration of wage claims that implicate the
FLSA. 23 4 Alternatively, the court challenged the Department of
Labor to develop a policy of deferral to arbitration awards similar
to that adopted by the National Labor Relations Board. 23 5- A deferral policy would encourage arbitration as the "crucial compo23 6
nent of industrial self-government."
F. Summary Analysis of the Lower Court Cases
Despite the disarray in the lower courts regarding the
FLSA/collective bargaining relationship, certain conclusions are
evident. Rules of decision based on early-but now discredited -Supreme Court statements about the relationship bethus "'protect[ed] complying employers from the unfair wage competition of the noncomplying employers.'" 457 F. Supp. at 952 (quoting S. REP. No. 145, 87th Cong., 1st Sess. 40,
reprinted in [1961] U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS 1620, 1659). The Senate report observed
that § 17 actions were more effective for enforcing employee rights and deterring potential
violators than § 16 actions, which allow recovery of back wages and liquidated damages. Id.
Several courts have also accepted this assumption. See Hodgson v. Wheaton Glass Co. 446
F.2d 527, 532 (3d Cir. 1971); Wirtz v. Malthor, Inc., 391 F.2d 1, 3 (9th Cir. 1968);
Hodgson v. Parke, 324 F. Supp. 1297, 1300 (S.D. Tex. 1971); Wirtz v. L. A. Swann Oil
Co., 293 F. Supp. 211 (E.D. Pa. 1968).
231 457 F. Supp. at 952.
232 Id. at 952-53; accord, Wilco v. Swan, 346 U.S. 427, 431-32 (1953); Evans v. Hudson

Coal Co., 165 F.2d 970 (3d Cir. 1947).
233 457 F. Supp. at 953. The court further noted that Congress specifically freed the
National Labor Relations Board from the preclusive effect of an arbitration decision. See 29
U.S.C. § 160(a). Even though the arbitral award was not held binding on the parties, the
court noted that the award was admissible into evidence. 457 F. Supp. at 953 n.15.
234 Id. at 952 n.14. This novel suggestion would permit the Secretary of Labor to inject
his views concerning wages and hours into arbitration. It is difficult to see how this approach would resolve questions of the parties' intent, which is the basis for the arbitration
in the first place. See also Trafalgar Shipping Co. v. Int'l. Mill Co., 401 F.2d 568, 572-73
(2d Cir. 1968).
457 F. Supp. at 953.
23 457 F. Supp. at 953. See generally note 206 supra.
232
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tween the FLSA and collective bargaining (Lerwill) or that focus
exclusively on the FLSA's remedial provisions to carve out a right
of action irrespective of a collective bargaining agreement (Iowa
Beef Packers, Abbott, arid Coach House Restaurant), dramatically understate or simply ignore legislative and judicial guidance on this
issue. Furthermore, cases that utilize fictions to thwart the application of contractual grievance procedures to wage and hour
claims (Leyva) are inconsistent with the presumption favoring the
use of grievance procedures and invite creative interpretations of
labor agreements that ignore the parties' intent. Cases relying on
analogous interpretations of civil rights statutes (Leone) that are
inapposite to the FLSA/collective bargaining relation completely
misperceive the issue. All of these cases promote the litigation of
disputes that are best left to collective bargaining, thus undermining industrial stability and eroding the exclusivity, exhaustion, and
finality principles of contract negotiation and administration.
Even those cases that base their decisions upon the perceived
preeminence of collective bargaining (Beckley, Satterwhite, and
Arkansas-Best) have not comprehensively analyzed the FLSA/
collective bargaining relationship. Indeed, none has considered
the issue in light of the legislative underpinnings of the FLSA and
the demise of Jewell Ridge Coal and Bay Ridge. Without these fundamental considerations, a correct rule of decision is impossible to
formulate.
Thus, the scope and stability of collective bargaining may depend on either the court in which an FLSA suit is filed or on
whether the named plaintiff is an individual employee or the Secretary of Labor. This Article attempts to remedy this unacceptable
state of affairs by suggesting a proper balance between the FLSA
and the national policy favoring collective bargaining.

The Department of Labor and the courts have not considered an existing collective
bargaining relationship as a bar to Labor Department lawsuits. See, e.g., Marshall v. Ir
Continental Baking Co., 26 Fed. R. Serv. 2d 887 (S.D.N.Y. 1978) (FLSA injunctive action
challenging non-inclusion of certain payments in base wages under collective bargaining
agreement); Hodgson v. Six Flags Over Georgia, Ltd., 69 Lab. Cas.
32,752 (N.D. Ga.
1972) (employer required to prove exemption from statutory requirements despite collective bargaining agreement); Wirtz v. William H. LaDew, Inc., 282 F. Supp. 742 (E.D. La.
1968) (despite collective bargaining relationship and employee overtime waiver, FLSA injunction action permissible); Mitchell v. Barbee Lumber Co., 35 F.R.D. 544 (S.D. Miss.
1964) (statutory minimum wages and overtime pay not subject to negotiation); Wirtz v.
William M. Buckley, 47 Lab. Cas. 31,436 (D. Kan. 1963) (FLSA injunctive action permissible despite union agreement to waive overtime); Mitchell v. Feinberg, 123 F. Supp. 899
(E.D.N.Y. 1954) (compliance with collective bargaining agreement does not excuse FLSA
overtime pay deficiencies).
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V
THE PRIMACY OF COLLECTIVE BARGAINING

A. The Presumptive Validity of Collectively Bargained Wage and Hour
Formulae
Congressional support of collective bargaining in FLSA matters 23 7 and collective bargaining's fundamental role in our national labor policy, codified by the Taft-Hartley amendments,2 38
require that FLSA questions be resolved under standard contract
negotiation and administration analyses whenever a collective bargaining relationship exists. 23 9 Labor unions are better able to
police wage and hour schemes and protect the interests of their
members than the Secretary of Labor. Although FLSA requirements are not always negotiated into a labor agreement, employee
interests are protected by the NLRA's duty to bargain. This fundamental guarantee of free collective bargaining allows the union
and employer to exchange wage and hour claims for other ben240
efits deemed more valuable by the union and its members.
Collective bargaining subjects arguably covered by the FLSA
should generally receive no special status.
This is not to suggest that wage computation or time-worked
formulae in a labor agreement that vary from the FLSA's literal
requirements should establish an absolute defense to an FLSA action. Courts should treat wage and hour matters incorporated into
collective agreements as presumptively valid, subject to challenge
only in carefully limited circumstances. Plaintiff employees should
be permitted to challenge their union's-and their employer'sconduct involving FLSA matters only through a breach of contract action under section 301(a) that also alleges a breach of the
See notes 91-103 and accompanying text supra.
See notes 104-27 and accompanying text supra.
See notes 120-27 and accompanying text supra.
At first blush, it might appear that this approach necessarily confers an unfair advantage on the unionized employer over his non-unionized counterpart. The unionized
employer may, for example, negotiate less costly overtime rates in exchange for other
benefits, such as higher hourly rates, desired by the union. The non-unionized employer,
on the other hand, is forced to work within the rigid statutory framework of the FLSA.
This unfair advantage is illusory. The trade-off is that the non-unionized employer
may reduce wages at will so long as the), are above the statutory minimum. Apart from this
minimum, the FLSA mandates only the formulae for determining overtime pay. The
unionized employer, however, would commit an unfair labor practice by unilaterally changing wage rates. He can do so only after he has fulfilled his duty to bargain with the union
representing the affected workers. Thus, although the unionized employer can bargain
with the union to reduce overtime, the non-unionized employer may do so unilaterally as
long as FLSA formulae are observed.
237
238
239
240
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union's duty of fair representation. Generally, the courts should
find a breach of the duty of fair representation only when it is
established that the union acted in bad faith or without honesty of
purpose by negotiating a compensation arrangement that does not
comply with the FLSA.2 4 1 Courts should require employees to
resort to contractual grievance procedures in every case; otherwise, the validity of negotiated dispute resolution procedures is
undermined. This approach, to paraphrase Justice Harlan, 242 allows the union and employer to split FLSA benefits without an
unacceptable sacrifice to FLSA policy interests.
The Secretary of Labor should similarly establish that the
union breached its duty of fair representation before he may sue
for an FLSA violation. In overtime pay cases, however, the Secretary should meet one further requirement. His action either to
recover FLSA wage deficiencies or to obtain injunctive relief
should be dismissed unless he establishes that the collectively bargained overtime compensation arrangement is not "substantially
243
equivalent" to statutorily required overtime.
B. Controlling Principles in Employee Wage Suits
Justice Frankfurter suggested in his Bay Ridge dissent that
wage agreements should be tested under a fair representation
analysis. 24 4 He argued that literal compliance with the FLSA is
not required; labor agreements are deemed legitimate so long as
they are not an artifice or subterfuge designed to evade the
FLSA. 2 45 Justice Frankfurter framed the union's FLSA obligation
and its latitude to negotiate wage provisions as follows:
Unless it be judicially established that union officers do not
know their responsibility or have betrayed it, so that what ap241 Because the FLSA variance issue will always involve a contract term or practice expressly or impliedly agreed to by the union, the general standard of conduct that should
apply is the contract negotiation analysis imported from fair representation cases. See note
125 and accompanying text supra. When the labor agreement contains a grievance procedure, the union's failure to process a FLSA claim should be tested under the duty of fair
representation's grievance handling standard.
242 "[It may well be that certain types of federal statutory benefits will lend themselves
to arbitration or splitting without an unacceptable sacrifice in competing policy interests."
U.S. Bulk Carriers, Inc. v. Arguelles, 400 U.S. 351, 366 (1971) (Harlan, J., concurring).
207
243 Cf. 29 U.S.C. §
(g)(3) (1976) (allowing employer and employee agreement on
"substantially equivalent" base rate for computing overtime). This theory is discussed in
more detail at notes 266-73 and accompanying text infra.
244 334 U.S. 446, 479 (1948) (Frankfurter, J., dissenting). See notes 76-89, 96-98 and
accompanying text supra.
245 334 U.S. at 487-88, 492.
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pears to be a contract on behalf of their men is mere pretense
in that it does not express the true interests of the union as an
entirety, this Court had better let the union speak for its members and represent their welfare, instead of reconstructing, and
thereby jeopardizing, arrangements under which the union has
246
lived and thrived and by which it wishes to abide.

Absent proof of bad faith, collusion, or dishonesty by the union,
courts should uphold wage arrangements that reflect the interests
of the employees represented by the union.2 4 7
This FLSA/collective bargaining analysis comports with section 301(a)'s standard for valid contract negotiations: the union
must bargain in good faith and with honesty of purpose. 248 This
approach not only reconciles the FLSA/collective bargaining conflict with congressional intent but also promotes negotiation and
enforcement of labor agreements under section 301(a). It also
shields the sanctity of collective bargaining from unprincipled judicial attempts to carve out questionable FLSA theories of recovery.
Challenges to wage settlements that allegedly do not comply with
the FLSA would be scrutinized under the carefully developed section 301(a) doctrines of exclusivity, exhaustion, and finalitydoctrines that the Supreme Court has held sufficient to protect the
individual interests of organized employees as well as the institutional interests of unions and employers. 4 ' Dissident employees
should possess no greater right to second-guess their statutory
bargaining agents by suing under the FLSA for windfall recoveries over and above negotiated settlements than they do to
challenge collective bargaining agreements. The careful balancing of individual employee rights, majority rule, and labor
peace ' 50 under section 301(a) would thus be preserved on matters
at the very heart of the collective bargaining relationship: the
negotiation of wages and hours.

246
247

Id. at 493.
Justice Frankfurter supported this proposition by citing two cases-Steele v. Louis-

ville & N.R.R., 323 U.S. 192 (1944) and Tunstall v. Brotherhood of Locomotive Firemen
and Enginemen, 323 U.S. 210 (1944)-in which the Union's bad faith representation negated the binding effect of collective bargaining agreements. 334 U.S. at 493 n.10. In his
dissent in Walling v. Harnischfeger Corp., 325 U.S. 427, 439 (1945), Chief Justice Stone
also suggested that FLSA/collective bargaining questions should be resolved under a test of
mutual good faith. See note 77 supra.
248 See note 125 and accompanying text supra.
249 See notes 120-27 and accompanying text supra.
250 See notes 104-08 and accompanying text supra. Labor peace is also an objective of the
FLSA. See 29 U.S.C. § 201 (1976).
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Where the labor agreement does not contain a grievance
procedure, employees may sue directly in court. A judicial determination of an FLSA violation in such cases, however, must also
require a finding that the union violated its duty of fair representation by negotiating the disputed provision. The court should
dismiss the FLSA claim if no such finding is made. Where the
labor agreement provides a grievance procedure, a court should
dismiss the FLSA claim if the grievance procedure has not been
exhausted 23 1 unless the contract also contains a clause that specifically excludes the FLSA claim from the grievance procedure.
Without such an explicit exclusion, all "[d]oubts should be resolved in favor of coverage"2 52 because "only the most forceful
evidence of a purpose to exclude the claim from arbitration
[should] prevail." 253
There are a number of factors courts should consider when
examining the union's honesty of purpose and subjective good
faith in negotiating the challenged provision. 25 4 One factor,
251 When considering FLSA claims, arbitrators should confine their review to an in-

terpretation of the collective bargaining agreement. Arbitrators possess neither the jurisdiction nor the expertise to enforce statutory rights. They should not, therefore, refer to the
statutory language to determine the validity of contractual wage and hour provisions.
Their duty is to interpret the negotiated meaning of the contract language; once this
meaning is ascertained, the FLSA issue will normally be settled.
Not all arbitrators, unfortunately, have recognized these limitations on their authority.
See, e.g., Pennsylvania Elec. Co., 47 Lab. Arb. & Disp. Settl. 526, 527 (1966) (Stein, Arb.);
Youngstown Sheet and Tube Co., 14 Lab. Arb. & Disp. Settl. 752, 756 (1950) (Updegraff,
Arb.). But see Hilo Transp. & Terminal Co., 33 Lab. Arb. & Disp. Settl. 541, 543 (1959)
(Burr, Arb.); International Harvester Co., 17 Lab. Arb. & Disp. Settl. 29, 30 (1951)
(Seward, Arb.); California Cotton Mills, 16 Lab. Arb. & Disp. Settl. 335, 337 (1951) (Marshall, Arb.). For an excellent general discussion of the scope of an arbitrator's authority to
interpret statutes, see Edwards, Labor Arbitration at the Crossroads; The 'Common Law of the Shop'
v. External Law, 32 ARB.J. 65 (1977). See also F. ELKOURI & E. ELKOURI, How ARBITRATION
WORKS 321-34 (1973).
252 United Steelworkers v. Warrior & Gulf Navigation Co., 363 U.S. 574, 583 (1960).
253 Id. at 585.
2"54The underlying premise that courts employ to analyze these factors is that unions

should be permitted broad latitude in contract negotiations to fashion compensation arrangements best suiting their members' needs. Indeed, it is often difficult to adduce direct
evidence that the union did not bargain honestly or that it conducted negotiations in bad
faith.
Subject to the considerations discussed at note 125 supra, however, courts, in assessing
the union's bargaining conduct, should consider a number of factors when an allegation is
made that the union impermissibly compromised FLSA rights. The union's good faith
might be demonstrated by a showing that FLSA rights were traded in arms-length negotiations for wage increases, for jobs in a failing business, or to satisfy other employment
conditions peculiar to the industry and the employees within the bargaining unit. Good
faith bargaining is inferrable from the union's demonstrated ability to represent employees,
and to attain high wage scales and fringe benefits for bargaining unit members. Contract
ratification votes are also significant evidence. Evidence of past literal compliance with the
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however, should establish presumptive evidence of bad faith:
sub-minimum wages. The FLSA embodies a social judgment that
the price of labor in covered industries should not fall below a
designated minimum. 25 5 The legislative debates indicate that
Congress intended the FLSA to cover both weak unions and unorganized workers. 256 If wages are negotiated below the statutory
minimum, the union should be regarded as a weak organization
incapable of meaningful collective bargaining and thus qualified
as a group that Congress intended the FLSA to protect. Its acquiescence to sub-minimum wages would then be subject to chal25 7
lenge in an FLSA court suit.
Nearly all of the current FLSA/collective bargaining cases involve either compensable time or overtime pay disputes. Courts
should analyze these cases under the fair representation paradigm
and should distinguish them from hypothetical sub-minimum
wage situations-where the FLSA presumptively applies-in several ways. First, although the FLSA's legislative history characterizes overtime pay as a penalty on the employer, no legislative
debate or report discusses the relationship between overtime and
collective bargaining agreements.2 5 8 Second, by amending the
FLSA, Congress implicitly approved the employer's time-worked
and overtime pay arrangements-invalidated by the Court in

FLSA and union awareness of employee needs could be considered as well. Labor agreements containing terms relatively close to the FLSA statutory minimums, however, require
closer scrutiny, especially if the union recently negotiated provisions departing from the
FLSA. Before recovery should be permitted against the employer, the FLSA plaintiff
should be required to demonstrate that the union's departure from the FLSA was a betrayal of its duty fairly to represent the plaintiff.
255 See notes 23-38 and accompanying text supra.
2', Clearly, weak labor unions may be victimized in collective bargaining, as much as
unorganized workers. See notes 55-57, 63-68, 96 and accompanying text supra.
257 Evidence of subminimum wages should not, however, be considered per se unlawful.
A union might breach its duty of fair representation by failing to agree to an arrangement
reducing a costly item, such as excessively high overtime rates. If an employer could demonstrate that a variance fiom the FLSA's standards constituted the difference between a
business surviving or failing, a union's failure to agree is challengeable in a fair representation action when the employees subsequently become unemployed. It is not inconceivable
that a similar scenario might arise in a context of subminimum wages.
The Eighth Circuit recently noted that a union's failure to consider the impact of
grievances on employees who did not file the grievance constituted a breach of its duty of
fair representation. Smith v. Hussmann Refrigerator Co., 619 F.2d 1129, 1237 (8th Cir.
1980). In the FLSA context, if the union processes a grievance without considering the
interests of the majority, which is satisfied with the contract's wage and hour provisions
even though they are not in literal compliance with the FLSA, it will probably violate the
duty of fair representation.
258 See notes 62, 68 supra.

256
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Jewell Ridge Coal and Bay Ridge-because they were developed in
collective bargaining. 25 9 Third, the Portal-to-Portal Act specifically endorses collective bargaining 2 60 and implies that compensable working time questions are best left to the parties involved. 2 61
Fourth, it is only conjecture that one of the ostensible goals of
the FLSA's overtime provisions-spreading employment-is obtained by literal enforcement of the maze of overtime pay requirements. A number of studies indicate that overtime today, unlike 1938, is actually cheaper than recruiting, hiring and training
new employees to perform work otherwise performed by
employees already on the payroll. 26 2 Thus, the FLSA's public
policy of spreading employment by imposing the "penalty" of
overtime pay is tenuous at best. When employees, through their
bargaining agent, agree to compensation arrangements that
exclude certain overtime payments in exchange for other benefits,
courts should not interfere with the parties' judgment of what is
26 3
best for them.
Finally, each of the foregoing arguments refers only to the
FLSA. If one considers the preeminent federal policy favoring the
negotiation and enforcement of collective bargaining agreements,
any remaining doubt is dispelled that FLSA requirements must
yield to agreements fashioned through collective bargaining. The
union, as the employees' statutory agent, chooses from a number
of options and variables when negotiating agreements with
employers. Our labor policy holds that "the best interests of
employers and employees can most satisfactorily be secured ...
through ... collective bargaining between employers and the representatives of their employees" 264 The presumptive legitimacy
accorded collectively bargained wage settlements must persist even
if the settlement does not arguably comply with FLSA requirements.2 65
259 See notes 91-99 and accompanying text supra.

See note 93 supra.
261 See 29 U.S.C. § 251(b) (1976).
262 See note 11 supra.
263 The argument also applies to the FLSA's goal of eliminating excessive work hours.
The union polices hours of work in the same way it polices wages and other terms and
conditions of employment.
264 29 U.S.C. § 171(a) (1976).
265 Decisions holding that unions representing public employees may bargain away constitutional entitlements are analogous to the argument that FLSA rights may be waived in
collective bargaining. See, e.g., Gorham v. Kansas City, 101 L.R.R.M. 2290 (Kan. Sup. Ct.
1979) (collectively bargained termination procedure prevails over due process hearing requirement); Antinore v. State, 49 A.D.2d 6, 371 N.Y.S.2d 213, aff'd, 40 N.Y.2d 921, 358
N.E.2d 268, 389 N.Y.S.2d 68, 389 N.Y.S.2d 576 (1976) (negotiated grievance procedure
260
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C. Suits by the Secretary of Labor and Section 7 (g)(3) of the FLSA
When the Secretary of Labor files an action to recover alleged FLSA-deficient wages or to obtain injunctive relief, courts
should use the fair representation paradigm that has been
suggested for employee wage suits. Despite the court's decision
in Coach House Restaurant, collective agreements should not yield
to FLSA concerns simply because the Secretary of Labor is the
plaintiff.
The Coach House court's decision was misguided because it
focused unduly on the FLSA's injunctive policy to protect complying
employers from the unfair wage competition of noncomplying
employers. 2 " Although employee suits to recover unpaid FLSA
wages clearly have the same deterrent effect on noncomplying
employers as suits by the Secretary of Labor, the Coach House
court stated that collective bargaining policies prevail in the
employee suits but not in Secretary's suits. 2 67 The policy arguments in favor of collective bargaining are not diminished because
the Secretary's name appears on the complaint or because the
complaint seeks injunctive relief. Moreover, the NLRA's objective
of promoting the economic well-being of workers through collective bargaining contains an implicit check on unfair wage competition similar to the check provided by the threat of the Secretary's
suit. The'cost to the employer of an agreement achieved with
workers utilizing their collective strength in bargaining is probably
greater than the cost of perceived litigation over these claims with
the Secretary of Labor. Consequently, the unfair wage competition argument carries little, if any, weight in the unionized context.
One further restriction should also apply to suits brought by
the Secretary for overtime pay. The Secretary should refuse to
file overtime pay complaints unless the collectively bargained
method of paying overtime is not "substantially equivalent" to the
method allegedly required by the FLSA. The statutory "regular
rate of pay" is defined as "all remuneration for employment paid
to, or on behalf of, the employee," excluding certain specified
payments. 2 18 Section 7(g)(3) of the FLSA permits employers and
held to constitute waiver of certain procedural due process rights); Cary v. Board of Educ.,
427 F. Supp. 945 (D. Colo. 1977) (right to academic freedom protected by first amendment
waived by provision contained in collective bargaining agreement).
216 See note 230 and accompanying text supra.
267 457 F. Supp. at 951.

26829 U.S.C. § 207(e) (1976).
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employees to establish their own "basic rate" for overtime pay
purposes.2 6 " Payment of overtime at one and one-half times this
basic rate satisfies the FLSA if certain prerequisites are met.
These prerequisites include "substantial equivalence" between the
basic rate and the regular rate, prior agreement by the affected
employees, and prior authorization by the Secretary of Labor.2 7 °
Basic rates under section 7 (g)( 3 ) may be established with indi2 71
vidual employees or through collective bargaining.
269

Section 7 (g)(3) provides:
(g) No employer shall be deemed to have violated subsection (a) of this
section by employing any employee for a workweek in excess of the maximum
workweek applicable to such employee under such subsection if, pursuant to an
agreement or understanding arrived at between the employer and the
employee before performance of the work, the amount paid to the employee
for the number of hours worked by him in such workweek in excess of the
maximum workweek applicable to such employee under such subsection-

(3) is computed at a rate not less than one and one-half times the rate
established by such agreement or understanding as the basic rate to be used
in computing overtime compensation thereunder: Provided, That the rate so
established shall be authorized by regulation by the [Secretary of Labor] as
being substantially equivalent to the average hourly earnings of the employee,
exclusive of overtime premiums, in the particular work over a representative
period of time;
and if (i) the employee's average hourly earnings for the workweek exclusive of
payments described in paragraphs (1) through (7) of subsection (e) of this section are not less than the minimum hourly rate required by applicable law, and
(ii) extra overtime compensation is properly computed and paid on other forms
of additional pay required to be included in computing the regular rate.
29 U.S.C. § 2 07 (g)(3) (1976) (emphasis added).
270 These prerequisites include the following:
(1) The basic rate must be authorized by administrative regulations.
(2) The basic rate must be substantially equivalent to the employee's average
hourly straight time earnings for the particular work over a representative
period of time.
(3) The employee must agree to the establishment of a basic rate for overtime
pay purposes, either individually or through a union contract.
(4) The agreement between the employer and the employee must be entered
into before the overtime work is performed.
(5) The employer must enter in his records the date of the agreement and the
period which it covers.
(6) The employee's average straight time earnings must be not less than the
legal minimum-the highest rate required by the FLSA or other federal, state
or local law.
(7) Extra overtime compensation must be paid on other additional pay-such
as an incentive bonus or a shift differential-which is required to be included
in the regular rate.
29 C.F.R. 548.200 (1979).
7
271 Section (g)(3) does not distinguish between basic rate arrangements contained in a
labor agreement and those contained in an individual employment contract. See note 269
supra.
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Although its references to section 7 (g)(3) are infrequent, the
Wage-Hour Administration has not interpreted "substantial
equivalence" of the basic rate to require literal equivalence with
the statutory regular rate of pay. 272 Nor have distinctions been
made between arrangements contained in individual employment
contracts and those embodied in collective bargaining agreements.
If departures from literal equivalence of the regular rate computation for unorganized employees are permitted, section 7 (g)(3 )
also allows greater flexibility when a collective bargaining agreement is involved. Therefore, even if prior approval has not been
sought from the Wage-Hour Administration, the Secretary, in deference to the policy of collective bargaining and in the interest of
judicial economy, should formulate a policy of refusing to issue
substantial equivalence test of
overtime pay complaints unless the
273
violated.
been
has
7(g)(3)
section

CONCLUSION

The National Labor Relations Act creates a sweeping obligation for employers and employee representatives to negotiate and
bargain over all aspects of the terms and conditions of employment. Congress never intended the Fair Labor Standards Act to
interfere with this obligation. On the contrary, the legislative hisDeparture from literal compliance is sanctioned by regulation when additional payn2
ments do not "increase the total compensation of the employee by more than 50 cents a
week on the average for all overtime weeks." 29 C.F.R. § 548.3(e) (1979). The Administrator has explained that he tests the weekly effect on overtime and not the gross addition
to the employees' weekly wage: "The exclusion of one or more additional payments under
Section 548.3(e) must not affect the overtime compensation of the employee by more than
50 cents a week on the average for the overtime weeks." 29 C.F.R. § 548.305(c) (1979).
As early as 1964, the Wage-Hour Administrator issued an opinion letter holding that
the regular rate of pay for FLSA overtime pay purposes need not include a negotiated
yearly bonus of not more than $100.00 because its effect on overtime calculation was inconsequential. Op. Letter No. 307 of Wage-Hour Adm'r, [1961-66 Transfer Binder, Wages
and Hours, Admin. Rulings] LAB. LAW REP. (CCH) 30,913 (November 4, 1964). Similar
rulings were issued in Op. Letter No. 368 of Wage- Hour Adm'r, [1961-66 Transfer Binder, Wages and Hours, Admin. Rulings] LAB. LAW REP. (CCH) 30,980 (May 14, 1965)
and in Op. Letter No. 515 of Wage-Hour Adm'r, [1961-66 Transfer Binder, Wages and
Hours, Admin. Rulings] LAB. LAW REP. (CCH) 30,501 (October 4, 1966).
273 In Marshall v. Coach House Restaurant, Inc., 457 F. Supp. 946, 953 n.15 (S.D.N.Y.
1978), the court suggested that the Secretary of Labor implement a policy of deference to
arbitral awards similar to the National Labor Relations Board's deferral policy. This would
unquestionably ameliorate many of the concerns expressed in this Article. See notes 206,
236 supra.
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tory and subsequent amendments to the FLSA specifically recognize that collective bargaining plays a primary role in our national labor policy. The FLSA, unlike Title VII, must yield to that
role. Moreover, the Taft-Hartley Act's elevation of negotiation
and enforcement of labor agreements to the pinnacle of our national labor policy requires the analysis of FLSA disputes under
the standard contract negotiation and administration principles
utilized in fair representation cases. This approach best satisfies
the concerns of both the FLSA and the NLRA "without an unac' 2 74
ceptable sacrifice in competing policy interests.
The suggested approach would also provide a guidepost for
courts as they confront FLSA/collective bargaining questions. Decisions on this issue and its several variants are currently irreconcilable. These inconsistencies perpetuate the conventional wisdom
that the FLSA must necessarily override or influence collective
bargaining. The) provide incentives for litigants and courts to
carve out new and unwarranted exceptions to the exclusivity,
exhaustion, and finality rules of contract negotiation and administration. By returning to the fundamental premises of the FLSA
and the NLRA, courts could reconcile these statutes and avoid
skewed results.
Finally, and not least important, enforcing the preeminent
role of collective bargaining removes government from the business of regulating those who are best qualified to regulate themselves. Labor and management are in the best position to judge
what industrial trade-offs suit their needs. If the union and
employer consider higher wages and lower rates of overtime pay
preferable to the FLSA's rigid statutory scheme, they should have
the flexibility to embody that preference in their agreement. Although long-standing assumptions command deference,2 7 5 the
time is long overdue to step back and reconsider inelastic application of Depression-era legislation that fundamentally interferes
with the policy of free collective bargaining, particularly when that
24 U.S. Bulk Carriers v. Arguelles, 400 U.S. 351, 366 (1971) (Harlan, J., concurring).
27 The Supreme Court has stated that Congress is presumptively aware of an adminis-

trative or judicial interpretation of a statute and that the interpretation is adopted when
the statute is reenacted without change. See, e.g., Albemarle Paper Co. v. Moody, 422 U.S.
405, 414 n.8 (1974); Red Lion Broadcasting Co. v. FCC, 395 U.S. 367, 381 (1969).
Lohgstanding interpretation should not, however, defer collective bargaining to FLSA dictates. Considered alone, the legislative history of the FLSA indicates that it was not intended to interfere with free collective bargaining. On the contrary, Congress's decision to
overrule key decisions (Bay Ridge and Jewell Ridge Coal) demonstrates that collectivelybargained compensation arrangements should override the FLSA. The Taft-Hartley
amendments and section 301(a) also support this argument.
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legislation has been grossly misapplied to collective bargaining
questions. Justice Stewart borrowed an aphorism from Justice
Frankfurter when concurring in a decision that overturned a
long-standing interpretation of the Norris-LaGuardia Act. That
aphorism is equally appropriate here: "'Wisdom too often never
comes, and so one ought not to reject it merely because it comes
late.' "276

276 Boys Markets, Inc. v. Retail Clerks Local 770, 398 U.S. 235, 255 (1970) (Stewart, J.,
concurring) (quoting Henslee v. Union Planters Bank, 335 U.S. 595, 600 (Frankfurter, J.,
dissenting)).

